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ABSTRACT
In his text What (s Called Thinking? Heidcgger refers to thinking as "thanking"
and states that thinking is a "gift" to humankind from Being. Despite Heidegger's
insistence that Being is not a being, the language he uses to describe Being appears to
characterize Being as a being. Heidegger's insistence that Being is not a being is related
to his attempt to step outside of metaphysics, since metaphysics is unable to see the
difference between beings and Being, and thereby focuses on beings when it searches for
Being. It is not simply that Heidegger's language appears to make Being into a being,
but rather that it appears to make Being into God, which Heidegger thinks ofas a being.
Yet Heidegger's conception ofGod as a being is limited to the metaphysical conception
of God, and, as I will present in mytbesis, there is a difference between the metaphysical
conception ofGod, and the God offaith. Thus, it is only the narrownessofHeidegger's
conception of God which makes Being into a being. Therefore, if we step outside of the
metaphysical understanding ofGod we see that Being can be thought ofas analogous to
God, without being thought of as a being. This is precisely what I shall argue in my
thesis.
Along with discussing the analogy between God and Being [ will consider
whether Heidegger is successful in his aUernpt to step outside ofmetaphysics, thereby
avoiding the representational and subjectivist thinking metaphysics entails. It is the
language Heidegger uses in describing man's relation to Being that suggest an analogy
between God and Being. Yet this analogy presents the possibility that Heidegger is able
to think: Being through faith in much the same way that other thinkers within the
metaphysical tradition think ofGod. Furthennore, Heidegger appears to be trapped by a
language that is inherently metaphysical, yet he auempls to escape this language by
resorting to a phenomenology based on faith and poetry. In this thesis [will explore
Heidegger's conception of thinking as he presents it in Wbat Is Called Thinking? and
argue that the language Heidegger uses to describe Being make Being analogous to God.
Following from this I will examine the implication ofthis analogy on Heidegger's
aUempt to step outside of metaphysics.
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In the introduction to his work~ Heidegger points to the manner in
which we shoWd think of Being. To think of Being. be maintains., is not to think in the
manner that traditional Western metaphysics bas conceived of it Within this tradition.
which has its roots in Greek metaphysics, thinlring has been understood in terms of
forming ideas. Ideas are formed when a subject represents an object to itselr. An object
is rcpresentcd when it is made present to asubjecl through the subject's placing of the
object in &ont of itself so thai it can £ace it I For an object to be representable it must be
seen by. subject; when melaphysics thinks ofthe Being of beings it thinks orit in terms
ofwhat can be seen as a being. As. result ofttUs, when metaphysics tries to think of
Being it looks to beings inste.d, because it forgets the difference between Being and
beings.
According to Heidegger this difference is forgotten because of the ambiguity of
the word "Being": it is both a noun and a verb. Being refers to that which is present,
and the process ofcoming into presence.. When metaphysics inquires into Being the two
meanings are united and beings are looked at as both the process ofcoming into presence
and that which is present Although Being is the process by which beings come into
presc:nce, Being is forgotten because in revealing beings Being itself remains hidden. l
'Vycinas,Vincent~. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1961. Pg. 9S.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. On the Truth Q(Being. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1984. Pg. Sl.
Since it docs not acknowledge the diffcrcncc between being and Being metaphysics
tbinlcsofBcingas the totality of beings, or as the beingness (ousia) ofbeings, and
thereby it looks at beings as beings. Metaphysical investigation into the totality ofbeings
or the beingness ofbeings, takes place as an investigation into the universal traits of
beings. In conjunction with this investigation into the universal traits ofbeings
metaphysics looks to a highest being to explain the totality ofbeings. The highest being it
looks to is God.) According to Heideggermetaphysics interprets Being as the ground of
beings which grounds itself. Being is seen as a self-caused cause. as causa sui. As causa
sui Being is in fact seen by metaphysics as God.· Therefore metaphysics views Being as
God, the ground ofall beings, or as the totality ofbeings. In both instances Being itselfis
not thought ofand the metaphysical thinlcing ofBeing takes place as the thinking of
beings.
The metaphysical investigation of the totality ofbeings, which is interpreted as
Being, OCCUR through the representation ofbeings. Not only is metaphysics
representational, but according 10 Heidegger it is subjectivist as well. The representation
ofan object is the result of a representing subject. Throughout history the representing
subject evolves to become a subject that sees things as mere objects set up for and by
itself, rather than seeing things in their truth as that which has been revealed by Being.
Il!i!tPg. 55.
Heideggcr, Martin. Identity and Diffqcnce. Trans. And Intra. Joan Stambaugh. New
York.: Harper and Row Publishers. 1969. Pg. 60.
The subject is raised to a position of such prominence that everything, all objects, are
thought of in reference to the subject Heidegger sees me completion ofthis
metaphysical thinking within Nietzsche's metaphysic of the will to power. Nietzsche's
metapbysi<: brings together the representational and subjectivist aspects of metaphysics
that are revealed in the me:taphysic:a! investigation ofbeings, which is presumed to be an
investigation into the Being of beings.
Heidegger is adamant that me thinking constitutive of metaphysics is not the
thinking that thinks Being. Starting from~ be tells us that Being is not
definable, it is not aD entity which can be defined or represented as entities are within
Western thought. Being is the Being of beings., but it itselfis not a being.' From this
initial description of Being, or of what Being is DOl, Heidegger establishes the foundation
for his opposition to the thinlcing ofontology and metaphysics. This foundation resides in
Heidegger's claim that Being cannot be ensnared within traditional Western thought
because this thought looks to beings when it thinks of Being, and thereby the Being it
thinks is based on the beings that it finds within the world.
The thinking that Heidegger c:1aims to be the thinlcing that thinks Being does not interpret
Being as a being, it does not look to beings when it seeks Being. In facl, this thinking
does not seek at all; as we shan see in Discourse on Thinking tlUnking is rather a
Heidegger, Martin. Bejng and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New
York: Harper and Row Publisbers. 1962. Pg.7.
waiting.6 The thinking thai Heidcgger puts forward moves on a level that transcends
what has ordinarily, and unquestioningly, been thought ofas thinking. Furthermore, what
Heldegger refers to as thinking is in fact essential to the relation between Being and man.
In his work, What Is Galled Thinking? Heideggerpresents his notion ofthinJcing
as that which thinks Being in a manner that transcends the thinking ofBeing which is
characteristic ofWestcrn metaphysics. However, Heidcgger's descriptions of the relation
that occurs between man and Being through thinking seem to betray his position in
relation to metaphysics. In these works Heidegger equatcs "thinking" with "thanking"
and speaks ofthc "gift" Being bestows upon man. Through these descriptions Being
appears to be characterized as a being, a being which is given thanks and from which we
receive a gift. Although in his explanation of thinking he must insure that he does not
characterize thinking as that which makes Being into a being, the language he uses in
describing the relation between man and Being via thinking seems to betray him and the
thinking that he puts forward appears to be a thinking that docs think Being as a being. In
fact the being that Heidegger's language seems to make Being into is God. Within this
thesis [will explore what Heidegger says of''thinking''in What Is CaUed Thinking?
paying particular auention to the language he uses to describe the relation of man to
Being through thinking. Once [have carried out this exploration I will critically assess
the possible repercussions his language has on his position in relation to metaphysics,
Heidegger. Martin. Discourse on Thinking. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans
Freund. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 1966. Pg. 68.
specifically in tcnns ofwhether this language makes Being into a being.
Thave divided my thesis into three chapters, the tim ofwhich will consist ofan
elucidation ofHeidcgger's view ofmctaphysics as he presents it in the essay "'The Word
ofNictzsche: God is Dead". As backgroWld to this elucidation I will provide
Heidcggcr's account oftbc history ofrcprescntational thought as it manifests itself in
metaphysics, up to its manifestation in Nietzsche's metaphysic. Examining Heidcgger's
interpretation ofNictzsehe's metaphysic will not only reveal Heidegger's views on
metaphysics, but it will also reveal the direction Hcidcgger is talcing in moving away
from the subjectivist and represcntatiOllal manner ofmctaphysica1 thinking, to his own
notion ofthinking. Once Hcidcgger's interpretation ofmctaphysics has been explored
and a basis has been established for comparison between metaphysics and Heidegger's
thinking, [will move. in Chapter 2, into an exploration ofHeidegger's concept of
thinking as presented in his text What Is Called Thinking? The final chapter will then be
a critical discussion of Hcideggcr's notion ofthinking in relation to his position toward
metaphysics. It will focus on the qucstion ofwhethcr Heidcgger's notion of thinking
makcs usc ofthcologicaltcrtnS which make Being into God.
Chapter 1 HftMrgn 11M Mdqlaysks
Section /.0 Heidegger's account ofthe history ofmetaphysics prior (0 Nietzsche
[n otder adequatcly to explain Heideggcr's interpretation of metaphysics, recourse
to his essay "'The Wotd ofNictzschc: God is Dead" seems necessary, as it provides
Heidcgger's interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphysic. Sincc Nietzschc's metaphysic is
built upon the metaphysics of those who precedc him, Heidcgger's interpretation of
Nietzschc's metaphysic provida some insight into metaphysics in gcncral. From this
understanding ofmetapbysics, and in patticulat Nietzschc's metaphysic, a basis for
understanding Hcidcgger's notion of thinking as a response to metaphysical thinking is
established. However, prior to dclving inlo Hcidcgger's intctpretation ofNictzschc's
metaphysic as found within the essay "The Word ofNictzschc: 'God is Dead", I will
provide an account ofHeidcgger's interpretation ofthc history of the representational and
subjectivist nature of metaphysical thought in general. Therefore, a fuller presentation of
metaphysics in general, which goes beyond that provided in thc essay, will be laid out as
a background to understanding Nietzschc's metaphysic.
The metaphysical thinking that Ihjnks Being is a thinking that is marked by a
forgoncnncss of Being. Although the forgonenness ofBcing does occur because Being
withdraws from man, metaphysics hclps to keep Being in withdrawal by failing to
acknowledge the ontological difference between Being and bcings.7 By failing to
Heidegger, Martin. "Thc Word ofNietzschc: 'God is Dead'" From~
Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovin. New York: Harper and
Row Publishers. 1977. Pg. 110.
recognize the difference between Being and beings, which leads 10 an interpretation of
Being that is based on beings, metaphysics becomes representational in its thinking, and
subjectivist. Metaphysics thinks of Being as the truth of"what is", and it thinks of"what
is" in terms ofwhat is in the world. What is found in the world, as that which is, is the
hypokei",enon, the subject tbatlies before and comes into presence. During the history of
Western metaphysics the hypokeimenon, or subjec/Um, becomes the self-conscious ego
that represents objects to itself.' Through this emphasis on representation by the subject
the truth ofthe object is altered. The truth ofthe object is no longer to be found in its
unconcealment. which is what Heidegger defines as truth, bUI rather in the fact that it is
represented by a subject.
As has already been noted, for Heidegger, representation refers to making
something present by placing that something in front ofoneself so as 10 face it. When we
face something we see it. it appears before us in its presence. Representation corresponds
with the fact that Being, and thus beings in their Being, have been understood since
Greek ontology, as "presence", and beings themselves have been understood as that
which is present. This notion of presence is tied to the notion of sight because that which
is present. and that which we can make present, is that which is seen. Seeing and making
present are also brought together in the word "idea" which comes from the Greek word
IIliliL.Pg.83.
Ueidos" meaning "to see, face, meet, be face-to-face".' Originally, in Greek thought, an
idea which was seen or met was that which appearc:d from out of nonconcealment. In
Plato's thought, the concept of"idea"changes slightly from what Heidegger interprets as
its original focus on nonconcealment, to Plato's focus on the being which appears in the
appearing. This change in the concept of"idea" occurs in order to accommodate the
importance thai Plato places on the facl that an idea is that which is seen in the seeing.
In his book Hejdegger: From Phenomenology to Thought William Richardson
explains Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's doctrine ofIdeas as it relates 10 the notion
of non-concealment, or truth, and that of sight. Through Heidegger's interpretation of
Plato's doctrine ofIdeas the concept of representation comes into view. The
discemability ofrepresentation resides in the COrTeSpOndence between Heidegger's
definition of representation and Plato's emphasis on sight. Heidegger's definition of
representation finds its beginning in the very fact that making present is connected with
being seen, and it is in Plato's philosophy that vision is given immense importance.
Although it finds its beginning in Plato's metaphysic, vision remains important for the
representational thinking of metaphysics and in fact is given greater significance in
Nietzsche's metaphysic ofthe will to power.
Although for Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics truth is thought ofas non·
concealment, within Plalo's philosophy an alternate meaning oftruth emerges: truth
Heidegger, Martin. What Is Called Thinkjng? Trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray.
New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 1968. Pg.41.
becomes confonnity between a viewing and what is viewed. This change in the meaning
oftruth occurs in correspondence with Plato's doctrine of Ideas. As seen from the
definition of"idea" or "eidos" as provided by Heidegger, "idea" refers to a seeing. In
Plato's philosophy we find that while a being is what is already present, an Idea allows a
being to appear and be present as what it is., as its Idea. The Idea grants appearances of
itselfas the whamess or essence ofthe being. thus it is through the non-concealment of
the Idea that beings can "come-ta-presence" as what they are. lo Although the Idea itself
is unconcealed it is rather the Supreme Idea, ''the Good", that allows the Ideas themselves
to be visible. According to Heidegger the whatness. or Idea, is for Plato the Being of
beings. In Plato's philosophy, as Heidegger interprets it. a being's Idea is its see·
ableness, that which allows it to be seen as what it is. Therefore, the Idea is that which is
unconcealed and that which allows for non-conc:ealment. In Heidegger's conception of
Plato's philosophy the being·seen, the appearance, which is a consequence of non-
concealment, is viewed as the essence ofnon-concealment. Therefore, because the Idea
is thai which is unconcealed and made visible, the Idea becomes the unconcealed and the
essence of non.concealment. In fact, for Plato non-conceaiment becomes the Idea. non·
concealment becomes "something seen by a view".11 In that it is something seen by a
Richardson, William. Hejdl!gger' Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague:
Martinus NijhofT. 1963. Pg. 306.
IlThid..Pg.307.
view non-concealment essentially becomes ''that-which-is-to-be-seen, a being (eidos). ,,12
Furthermore, since for Plato Being and nolKOOCCa1ment an: Idea. and since Idea is
thought of as a being, Being comes to be thought of as a being. 11 Although non-
concealment is the Idea's act of self-revelation. in order for the Idea to be seen there
must be a seeing. Seeing the Idea then leads 10 lhe notion of a "correct" or "right" seeing
by virtue ofthe fact lhat seeing the Idea is determined by the see-ablenessofthe Idea.
Thereby a "correct" seeing is that which conforms to the Idea that is seen. l • From the
importance of sighI and the confomtity of sight to the seen, the notion oftroth as a correct
viewing emerges; this correct viewing is constituted by the confomtity of the viewing to
the viewed.
Truth as confomtity evolves 10 become truth as certitude. This evolution occurs
during the Middle Ages when faith is conceived ofas that which can guarantee truth.
Eventually the guarantee itself is thought of as a characteristic oftruth. thus the
conception oftruth as that which is guaranteed. or as certitude, emerges. 1J This
identification of truth with certainty takes its rise within the philosophy ofDescarte5, and
from this notion ofcertainty the representational nature ofthought is brought to the fore.
However. in Plato we see the potential for representation in the importance that is placed
11DiliLPg.308.
11I1W1.Pg.308.
1·.I!lliL.Pg.307.
15Imd. Pg. 320.
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on viewing and being seen. The fact that what is represented is what is viewed and seen
coincides with the visible-ness and sec-ability ofbeings that is their whatness. Once we
have secured the certainty ofourselves as the see-ers it is but a short step to thinking of
that which is seen as being dependent on the seeing.
It is in Descartes' philosophy that the ego cogito becomes certain of itselfas a
thinking thing and as a thing that represents other things to itself. The ego cogito in fact
becomes the ground of the certainty ofall beings. For Descartes certainty is thought of in
relation to a "bringing to a stand something that is finnly fixed and that remains".l6 This
fonnulation, with its emphasis on the object brought to a stand as that which is 6nnly
6xed and remains, is reminiscent ofthe formulation ofBemg as "presence" and ofbeings
as what is present., that is established within ancient ontology. As I have previously
stated that which is present is what "already lies before" and is referred to as the
hypolceimenon or subjectum. 17 As that which "already lies before" the subjectum is also
"that which of itself underlies all modalities of any phenomenon".'· The subjectum is
then the ground of all phenomena and that which guarantees thcircertainty. Not only
does it ground the certainty of all other phenomena, but it also grounds the certainty of
itself. Therefore, if Descartes is to find the source ofcertainty he must seek out the
subjectum.
'~cidegger. "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead..•. Pg. 82.
17J.billPg.83.
"Richardson. Pg. 322.
"
To begin with Descartes seeks OUI thc3ubjectum as that which is c:ertainofitsclf
and disc:overs that that which is c:crtain of itselris the ego cogito. Richardson iderltifies
three implications of the self-<:crtirudeofthe ego cogito: the first is thai thinking and
knowing come to be thought of as a process of proposing to the ego cogito what is
known; following from this, what is knowable is thought ofas what is opposed 10 man
and proposed by him; lasUy, that which is knowable is conceived ofas a proposed object
and proposing is conceived as objectivising. The definition ofcertitude thai arises from
the implications ofthc self-<:ertitudeofthe ego cogito is that certitude is a conformity
between the knowing and the known that is determined by the knower.. Furthennore,
Descartes reveals that lhe ego cogito is able to grolll1d all other certitudes simply because
it is a condition for them: an object cannot be proposed to oneself unless one is aware of
one's existence as the proposer ofwhat is proposed. In other words, it is self-
consciousness which is the basis of self-<:ertitude and the certitude of all other beings. In
self-consciousness occurs the proposing ofthe selfto the selfby the sel[lt
From the importance of the selfs proposing, or presentative function, the Being
of the selfcomes forward as this function ofpresentation. Furthermore, all beings thai
the self proposes and presents have their Being in their presentedness; their Being resides
in their having been presented. Thus everything is either an object or that which
objectifies. In objectification the being-as--object is related to the conscious ego and
through this relation the ego comes to recognize itselfas the ground oflhis relation; it
1'ilmL Pg. 323.
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recognizes itselfas the sub-jeer. From this recognition all beings are considered as
objects ofa subject or "sub-jeets" ofa subject. This subject~referenc:eofall beings is
referred to by Heidegger as "subject~ness". In subjeetness theobjeetivity ofobjects and
subjectivity of subjects. which is considered to be the Being of each, is constilUted. lO
Thus subjoctncss is the manner in which Being presences as what is.ll
Within Descartes' philosophy beings become objects presented. or represented. by
a self-conscious ego. The self.consc:ious ego then bcoomes the center of reference from
which beings are experienced and by which meaning is bestowed upon beings. Beings in
fact become objects for a subject. and the Being of beings becomes their objectiveness.
Richardson explains that with the identification ofbeings as objects. Being itself. as the
original process ofnonconcea1ment, is lost. Richardson maintains that Heidegger
believes that man replaces Being with the ascription of"value" to beings "in such a way
that it is the "value" that becomes the goal of all intercourse with beings"; in time this
intercourse is thought of as "culture" and in accordance the values come 10 be thought of
as "cultural values".u Cultural values are conceived ofas the goal of human creativity
and that which serve man in the attainment of his self-<:ertitude.l3 Richardson tells us
that once values are placed in the service ofman they can easily be reduced to the level of
"IhiJI.Pg.32S.
l1Heidegger. ''The Word ofNietzsche: 'God is Dead..•. Pg. 68, Footnote 9.
uRichardson. Pg. 327.
l3IlilibPg.327.
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objects, whereby they arc presented by man. This brings us to Nietzsche's metaphysic of
the will to power. whicb illustrates the progression from the object as represented by a
subject, to the object represented by a subject as value.
Section J. J Heidegger sreading ofNietzsche 's Metaphpics
According to Heidegger. in Nietzsche·s metaphysic. what is. which is beings in
their totality interpreted as Being, is represenled by the will to power.!~ The will to power
is a metaphysical principle by which the Being of beings is represented as value. In
order to explain the will 10 power I will proceed by examining Nietzsche's conception of
value, because the will to power can best be tmderstood from out ofan understanding of
Nietzsche's conception of value.
Nietzsche conceives of" value" as follows: 'The point ofview of ,value' is the
point of view constituting the preservation-enhancement conditions with respect to
complex fonns of relative duntion oflife within becoming".lS From this formulation of
"'Value" it is evident that the essence of value resides in its being a point of view. Value is
that which is in view for a seeing which aims at something. Moreover, as a point of view
It is important to note that Nietzsche himselfdoes not think ofms philosophy as a
metaphysic, but rather, as Heidegger says, views it as a countermovement to metaphysics.
However, Heideggcr maintains that as a countermovement which turns metaphysics
upside clown Niet7Ehe's philosophy remains inextricably entangled in metaphysics.(
Heidegger, "The WordofNieztsche: 'God is Dead'''. Pg. 61.)
Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead·... Pg. 71. From Nietzsche. The Will
~.Aph.715.
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value is posited by a see-er and for a sec-ef. This seeing is based on lhat which bas been
seen, and that which has been seen has been set before the~ by itself and posited as
what is sighted. This positing, which is considered 10 be a representing, determines the
point of view, and lherefore it is the seeing itself, or the sec-ef, which determines valUe.16
The importance ofsight, which began wilh Plato, is witnessed in Nietzsche's philosophy
and given an added dimension through its alignment with value. As previously
explained, in Greek ontology the thinlcing ofbeings occurs by making beings present, and
making beings present relies on sight In Descartes' metaphysic being seen and making
present is completely detennined by the seeing and thus the sce-er. However, in
Niet7sche's metaphysic not only is being seen and making present detcnnined by the see-
cr, but the beings that ue seen and made present arc determined in terms of value. As
this making.present and being seen is constitutive of thinking, and since for Nietzsche
making present and being seen entail value-positing, we can say that thinking occurs as
value-positing.
As his definition ofvalue states, value is detennined in reference to the
preservation.enhancement conditions oflife. What is valued is lhen looked upon as what
preserves life, to the extCDt that it stabilizes and secures life, and provides a level from
which enhancement can occur. Presentation and enhancement are based on life as the
highest value, and as a point of view value itself is a "view-tQ..life" and life in its essence
16Ibid. Pgs. 71-72.
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is a value-positing.27 For Nietzsche "life" does not refer to mere biological existence, but
ratJK· ., a metaphysical concept that is grounded in another ofNietzsche's metaphysical
concepts - "Becoming". Becoming is to be understood as the universal dynamism ofall
beings, which constitutes beings as beings and thereby can be thought of as the Being of
beings.1I As Heidcgger tclls us, Becoming is"thc fundamental characteristic of
everything real, i.e., ofeverything that is, in thc widest sense.'>l'J Thc will to power is in
fact a principle ofBecoming, and it is in examining the will to power that wc will come
to understand Becoming, and through Becoming understand Nietzschc's concept oflife
and its presczvation and enhancement conditions.
According to Richardson, when Leibniz applied the term "subject" beyond thc
human ego to all dynamic beings that havc an appetitc, or will, for further dynamism,
Being camc to be thought of as the dynamism of dynamic beings, which in tum was
conceived ofas Will. Nietzschc follows this line of thought interpreting the Being of
beings as Becoming and Becoming as Ibis dynamism or universal Will. However, the
universal Will is not to be equated with hwnan willing; it is a metaphysical notion and
not to be understood in relation to a psychological notion of "will".lO Nietzschc's will to
power, as Hcidegger presents it, is Ibis universal Will or dynamism that constitutes the
UnmLPg.73.
1IRichardson. Pg. 364.
It.lml:L.Pg.74.
lOR,jchardson. Pg, 365.
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Being ofbeings.J' I will now tum to Heidegger's explanation of tile will 10 power,
which is in fact an explanation of tile universal dynamism ofbeings understood in terms
ofNietzscbe's conception of the universal Will. As it is an explanation of the universal
dynamism of beings. Heidegger's explanation begins by presenting this dynamism in
terms of the act of willing.
For Nietzsche to will is to will-Io-be-master, and willing in itself is not a striving
or desiring, but a commanding.JZ The essence ofthis commanding is that the one who
commands is aware of his abilities as a commander. As Heidegger explains. "'the master
who commands has conscious disposal over tile possibilities for effective action".JJ
Furthennore, the one who conunands is himself obedient to his abilities to command and
the action. that results therein; therefore the commander is obedient to himself. Thus
Heidegger continues: "What is commanded in the command is the accomplishing of that
disposal. In the command, the one who commands (not only the one who executes) is
obedient to that disposing and to that being able to dispose, and in that way obeys
himsclf."JoI The superiority of tile commander is then revealed by way ofthe commander
Although Richardson identifies the will 10 power as a principle of Becoming it appears
that within Heidegger's interpretation ofNietzsehc's philosophy life, the will to power,
and becoming are interconnected. Hcidegger in fact states that for Nietzsche Becoming is
the will to power and the will to power is the fundamental characteristic of life. (
Heidegger, "The Word ofNietzsche: 'God is Dead Pg. 74.)
JZHeidegger, ''The Word ofNietzschc: 'God is Dead Pg.77.
JJJlWLPg.77.
J.llliliL.Pg.77.
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going beyood himself, ''be ventures even his own selr'." In this manner, commanding
can be thought of as self-conquest, and in that the will is commanding, it too can be
thought ofas self-conquest. Starting from itself the will wills to oven::ome itself by
willing: "For the will wills its will. Its will is what it has willed. The will wills itself. It
mounts beyond itself and must at the same time in that way bring itselfbehind itself and
beneath itself.'oJli Thus to will is to will to become stronger, and for Nietzsche strength
refers to power.
The essence of power is located in being master over an anained level ofpowCT,
which allows for power-enbancement and the will's over·powering of itself. This over-
powering. which employs an empowering, does not occur simply to reach more power,
rather the over-powering functions for the will to acquire power over itself.l7 The will to
power is then a will to will the overpowering of itself, in that this overpowering is power
itself. The will overpowers itself by surpassing its levels ofpower; this means that in
order to be sUlpllSSed levels ofpower must be preserved and secured. Yet on its own the
preservation and security ofJeveis ofpower is not sufficient; along with positing
conditions for the preservation ofpower the will must also posit conditions for the
enhancement of power:
The will must cast its gaze into a field of vision and first open it up
so that, from out oftltis, possibilities may first of all become apparent
lSDilit..pg. 77.
:l6lllliLPg. 77.
J1lllliL.Pg.78.
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that will point the way to an enhancement of power. The will must in
this way posit a condition for a wiJling-out-beyond itself.J1
The conditions that are posited are values, and the will is that which posits these values.
In his reading ofNictzschc Heidcgger bas already established that value bas the
character of a point ofvicw which determines the preservation-enhanccment conditions
of life within Becoming. The will to power, wxlcrstood as the will overpowering itselfin
its willing of itself, is that which determines the essence ofwhat is. The will to power
determines the esscnceofwhat is because what is, is thought ofin reference to the
preservation-enhancement conditions. Correspondingly, what is can be seen in terms of
value since the prcservation-cnhanccment conditions arc themselves viewed in relation to
value. Therefore, the will to power is able to detcnnine the csscnceofwhat is in terms of
value because the will to power is that which posits value. Anned with this
understanding of Nietzsche's definitions of,value" and the will 10 power we can now
retUrn to a discussion ofNictzsehe's place within the metaphysical tradition.
In Nietzsche's metaphysic the $ubjectum is the will to power. The will to POWcf is
a self-willing that is inherently a self-knowing-itselfthrough this self-willing. The
subjectum comes to presence in the manner ofa self-knowing-itself. This mode of
presencing is a self-presenting wherein thesubjectum presents itself to itself as the
koowing ego. Whereas in Descartes the subjectum was transfonncd into the self·
consciousness of an individual ego, in Nietzsche the subjectum is transformed into the
HnmL. Pg. 80.
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self-knowing-itselfofthe will to power; the subjectum is then the Being of beings,
Therefore, all that is is thought of in relation to the will to power as a self-Icnowing~itself,
which is also a self-willing. As Heidegger explains: ''In self-knowing-itself, all knowing
and what is knowable for it gathers itselftogeth.er.'>J9 Furthennore, in Nietzsche's
metaphysics of the will to power, truth as correctness is not confonnity between the
representing ego and what is represented; but rather truth consists in the accommodation
of the object to be presented to a standard imposed by the presenting subject When the
presentation is in accordance with the standard the presentation is considered to be
correct or true."
According to Richardson, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's will to power is an elaboration
and extension ofOescartes' conception of the presentative subject that becomes certain of
itself. Richardson explains that in the will to power this certification occurs when the
will to power preserves and secures for itself a constant reserve of beings that it has
gained, to which it can return in order to assure itselfof its gains and from which it can
move to attain more power,·1 Heidegger explains this as follows:
The preservation of the level of power belonging to the will
reached at any given time consists in the will's swrounding itself
with an encircling sphere of that which it can reliably grasp at,
each time, as something behind itself, in order on the basis of il to
contend for its own security. That encircling sphere bounds off the
constant reserve ofwhat presences (owio, in the everyday meaning
J'lli.!L.Pg.88.
"!!>illPg.89.
•1R..ichardson. Pg. 369.
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ofthis tenn fortbe Greeks) that is immediately at the disposal of
thewill.oIl
This constant reserve not only stands at the disposal of the will 10 power. but is in fact set
up by it as well. Nictzsc:he refers to the steadily constant as that which is "in being"; thus
the steadily constant is the marmcr in which beings arc in Being. Being as the will to
power.O In that the steadily constant, or the constant reserve has become constant, it is
verifiable. Furthcnnore, in order for an increase in power to occur an already achieved
level of power must be certified. To certify a level ofpower means that the level of
power is thought ofas held-for-true, that is, it has definitively been attained."" Through
this marmer ofcertific:a!ion, a constant, which has been represented by the will. is
rendered submissive to and dominated by the will to powcr.u
From this manner ofcertification and representation everything is now either the
object as represented by a subject, or the subject that objectifies the objc<:t by
representing it, setting it up before and delivering it 10 itselfas the ego cogito. When the
object is delivered up 10 the ego. the ego proves 10 be thai which delivers up and sets
before, and thereby it proves to be the subjecrum. In this manner, the "subject is subject
for itself' and the essence of consc:iousness becomes self-consc:iousness." In the subject
oIlHeidegger, "'The Word ofNietzsc:hc: 'God is Dead..•. Pgs. 83-84.
°niliLPg.84.
"IllliLPg.83.
4JRjchanison. Pg. 371.
~eidegger. "The WordofNietzsc:he: 'God is Dead"'. Pg. 100.
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becoming subject for itself everything that is is seen as the objecl ofthe subject or the
subject of the subject; following from this the Being ofwhal is comes to moide in a
"setting·itself·before--itself' which is a "setting.itself.up...n The inevitable conclusion
from this setting.itself·up which man perfonns is thai:
Man, within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up inlo the
subjectivity ofhis essence. Man enters inlo insurrection. The world
changes into object. In this revolulionary objectifying ofeverything
thai is, the earth, that which first of all must be pul at the disposal of
representing and setting forth, moves inlo the midst of human positing
and analyzing. The earth itselfcan show itself only as the object of
assault, an assault that, in hwnan willing. establishes itself as un·
conditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere - because
willed from out of the essence of Being - as the object oftcchnology.41
As an object oftcchnology, Nature is exploited relentlessly as a raw malerial for human
utilization. Nature then becomes the constant reserve which man sets up 10 grasp 10 and
ensure himselfofIlls gains in order to progress toward further acquisitions. It is through
this objectification ofNature that man's willing properly responds 10 the Being ofbeings
as the will to power. Furthermore, in properly responding to the will to power man also
becomes he who posits values and detennines everything that is in terms of values. Thus
Nature is not only objectified, bUI is viewed in terms of value.
Heidegger concludes that the natura1 outcome ofthe fact that everything now is
seen and responded 10 as a value is that Being can be seen in a similar way. In facl Being
can be seen as the highest value because "to be" has become ''to have value",
47nmt..Pg.100.
"DWl Pg. 100.
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Furthermore, when Being is seen as a value and "to be" becomes "'to have value", the
metaphysical basis has been provided for the human activity that posits beings as value in
relation to the preservation and enhancement ofpower. When this basis is established
Being itself, manifesting itself in the mode of the will to power accomplishes itself as the
will to power through man.'"
Through the will to power, as the Being of what is, everything that is is thought of
in tenns ofvalue and therefore everything that is becomes an object that submits to and is
dominated by the will to power. This value-positing and the values posited therein are
not distanced from buman beings; rather, the values ofthe will to power "directly
detennine human representing and in like manner inspire buman activity."so According
to Heidegger, when the will to power is taken as the principle ofall value-positing and is
experienced and accepted as "'the reality ofthe real, as the Being ofeverything that is"
then man "passes over into another history that is higher".sl In passing over inlo this
history that is marked by the experience and acceptance ofthe will to power as the Being
ofbeings modem humanity wills itself as the one who carries out the will of the will to
power. Humanity wills its own being human as the will to power, and that being human
is experienced as belonging in the reality determined by the will to power. This human
willing corresponds to a fonn of man's essence that moves beyond and surpasses man as
~ Pgs. 102-103. See footnote 39.
"'Il!ilLPg.95.
sl.l!lliL.Pg.9S.
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be has been until now. l1
The form of man's essence, when be moves beyond and surpasses man as be has
been until now, is caned "overman"; the essence ofoverman is a willing that wills in
accordance with the: will to power, since the overman is from out ofthe reality
determined through the will to power. In thai the essence of the overman is a willing that
corresponds to the will to power the question is raised as to how man's essence as willing
is to correspond adequately with the will to power and thereby be capable of making
everything that is submissive to itself; "Unexpectedly, and above all in a way unforeseen,
man finds himself, from out of the Being of what is, set before the wk of taking over
dominion ofthe earth.'>!] Man's being is starting to appear as the will to power, yet man
is not prepared for Being, be is not prepared to go beyond himself for the sake of Being
and thereby activate the will to power within his own activity. However, this ''man up to
now" is surpassed when he accepts the will to power as the Being ofwhat is by
manifesting the will to power in his own willing. When the win to power is taken up into
the willing of the overman the overman wills himself in the manner of the will to power.
Section 1.1 Summary and Conclusion
Metaphysical thinking, as Heidegger conceives of it, is representational.
Representation only becomes clearly visible in the philosophy of Descartes; however, in
11DlliL. Pgs. 95-96.
l].IliliL Pg. 96-97.
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Plato's philosophy vision, which plays a prominent role in representation, is emphasized.
In Descartes' philosophy man is the subject who becomes certain of himselfas the
subject that grounds the certainty of aU other beings, by representing these beings to
himself. Man becomes the focal point around which everything that is rotates. In
Nietzsche's philosophy this repm;entation, and the accompanying subject.ism, escalates
such that man not only represents everything to himself, bUI represents everything as
value. lbat which has value for man is that which can aid him in the preservation and
enhancement of life. Thus anything which man deems valuable is that which man can
utilize and exploit for his own advancement.
As a result oflhis representational and subjectivist thinking that characterizes
metaphysical thinking, Being is forgotten. The forgonenness of Being is what Heidegger
refers to as ''nihilism'' and since this forgottenness of Being is prevalent throughout the
history ofmetaphysicaJ thought the history ofmetaphysics itself is the history of
nihilism.SoI In Nietzsche's philosophy the forgottennness of Being is wlblessed by the
fact that Being is seen as a value and thereby not seen as it is in itself. As Heidegger says
"Nothing is happening to Being" in the sense that Being is being forgonen.JJ Heidegger
maintains that when the Being ofbeings becomes value, acceM to an experience ofBeing
itselfis destroyed. This access to Being has been in the process ofbeing closed off since
the beginning of Western thought, because Western thought has always conceived of
SoIIJlliL.Pg.109.
!1IlWL.Pg.l04.
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Being as the Being ofbcings. and thereby has looked to beings instead of Being itself.
Heidegger refers to lhe value-positing ofthc will to power, which posits everything as
value, as a radical killing that reduces what is to a value and conceals Being itsclfby
making it into a value. As Heidcgger explains:
The valuc-thinkingofthc metaphysics oflhe will to power is
murderous in a most extreme sense, because it absolutely does
not let Being itselftake its rise, i.e., come into the vitality of its
csscncc. Thinking in tcnns ofva1ucs precludes in advance that
Being itselfwill attain to a coming to presence in its truth.S6
For Heidcggcr lhe cssencc of nihilism resides in history, wherein the appearing and truth
ofwhat is in its entirety appears as beings, because Being itself is left unthought.
Metaphysics. as the histlXyofthe truth of what is, is essentially nihilism, in that this
history is the history of the forgottcnness of Being." However, the history of me truth of
what is, is not solely the history of the forgottenness of Being because the forgottcnness
of Being in fact comes forth as a destiny from Being itself. Nihilism is a history "'that
runs its course with Being itself','· It is from Being itself that it is unthought because
Being withdraws itself. Metaphysics is then the history of the self·withholding of Being
and thus the history oflhe forgottenness ofBcingemerging from the destining of Being
itself.
Throughout the history of metaphysics it is clear that metaphysics does not think
"nWl Pg. 108.
'7.!JlliL.Pg.I09,
nnwLPg.1I0.
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Being because metaphysics remains on the lC'Jel ofbcings. In that it does remain on the
lC'Jel ofbcings metaphysics engages in a thinking of beings that is representational and
dominated by subject-ism. As Heidegger has told us in his essay "The Word of
Nietzsche: 'God is Dead.... although metaphysics has forgotten Being, Being itself has
determined this forgetting through its self-withholding. This forgottcrumcss ofBcing and
Being's self-withholding constitute the relation between man and Being that occurs
within metaphysics. In essence this relation is not a relation at all since man docs not
come in contact with Being.
HowC'Jer, through the thinking that Heidegger presents, man and Being do come
into contact. 1bc manner of thinking Heidegger puts forward recognizes the
representational and subjectivist manner ofmetaphysical thinking and abstains from both.
Thinking for Heidcgger is the means by which man acx:omplishcs his relation to Being.
Through Heidegger's thinking the difference between beings and Being is acknowledged
and beings come to be seen in their truth as beings that are unconcealed by Being, rather
than as objects represented by a subject. Thinking, for Heidegger, moves outside of the
subject-object dichotomy that metaphysical thinking uses to dominate all beings and
instead completes the relation between Being and man; this relation allows for Being to
"take its rise" as Heidcggcr says and be revealed as the process of non-concealment. I
shall now twn to Heidegger's notion of thinking as be presents it in~
Ibinki.n&1. paying particular attention to the language he uses in describing the relation
ofBcing to man through thinking. I will focus on this particular text of Heidegger's since
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it not only elucidates Heidegger's notion of thinking, but also considers the origin ofthe
notion of"'thinking" within Western metaphysics, pinpointing where metaphysics fell
away fiom its origin. In providing this history ofwhat has come to be known as thinking
within metaphysics, Heidegger brings to light the fundamental differences between
metaphysical thinking and his thinking, and points the way toward his conception of
thinking.
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Section 2.0 What e.usfor Thinldng?
In this chapter I will present Heidegger's conception of''thinkjng'' as he explains
it in What Is Called Thinking? From the examination ofHeidegger's interpretation of
metaphysics., in particular Nietzsche's metaphysic, we have seen that Heidegger views
metaphysical thinking as a subjectivist and representational thinking. Heidcggcr's
understanding ofthc metaphysics of Plate, Descartes and Nietzsche reveals his bcliefthat
metaphysical thinking docs not think ofBcing in a manner which recognizes Being as
Being. In his text What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger presents his notion ofa thinking
which does think Being as Being. Part I of What is Called Thinking? is an examination
ofHeideggcr's statcmcnt that the most thought-provoking thing today is that we are still
not thinking. In that section. Heidcgger considers why we are still not thinking; through
this examination he makes the distinction between "thinking" and the representational
thinking which characterizes contemporary man, particularly the thinking found within
metaphysics. Part DofWbat Is Called Thinking? begins with an analysis ofthc question
"what is called thinking?" and carries out this analysis by distinguishing and examining
four ways in which the question can be posed. [will focus primarily on the second half
ofHeidcgger's text in order to uncover what Heideggcr's notion of"thinking" means and
to examine the relation ofman to Being that occurs through thinking.
A briefreOection on the ambiguity of the question ''what is called thinking?"
begins the second half ofthe text This reflection leads to Heideggcr's suggestion thai this
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ambiguity, which must be clarified. hides possible ways of tackling the question. There
are four ways ofposing the question which enable differenl means ofdealing with it. The
fint concerns what the words "thinking" and "thought" signify, and that to which the
name "thinking" is given. Secondly, the question can be posed in terms of bow thinking
has been ttaditionaJly defined and conceived." Although the first and second questions
appear similar, the first question leads Heidegger into an exploration of the etymology of
the words ''thinking'' and "though," by returning to their origin in Old English. wbile the
second question leads Heidegger into a historical return to the Greek origin of
metaphysical thinking. Heidegger lells us that both questions refer to the emergence of
"thinking" from differenl sources of its essential nature.60 Thus the essential nature of
thinking consists in what the Old English and ancient Greek tell us of"thinking". In
returning to its origin in Old English Heidegger will listen to what the language ofOld
English reveals ofthe original meaning of"thinking". However, in returning 10 the
ancient Greek origin of"thinking" Heidegger will focus on listening 10 the call of Being
which called thinking into its metapbysical conception as logic. The third manner of
posing the question focuses on determining what the requirements are for thinking "with
essential rightncss".61 Lastly the question can be directed toward asking about that which
calls us to thinJc. According to Heidegger these four ways ofasking the question are
''Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? Pg.II3.
~Pg.163.
61Ilili1.Pg.1l4.
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interTelated and united by the fourth question, since the manner in which the question is
asked in the fourth way is the manner in which the question ''would want to be asked first
in the decisive way".w
The fourth manner of posing the question. which is ''what calls for thinking?"
reveals that the question "what is called thinking?" is directed at hwnankind. that we are
being called upon to think. This insight hinges on the fact that the verb 'io call" is altered
or redirected from the original question to the fourth manner ofasking it. While the verb
''to call" is usually associated with name signification, in the fourth form of the question
"to call" is used to refer to calling in the sense ofcalling out to somcone.6J Heidegger
does not conceive of this manner ofcalling as a mere calling out in command toward
someone; rather "the call" is focused on an "anticipatory reaching out for something that
is reached by 01lT call, through our calling:'" Thus for Heidegger "the call" is not
imposing but inviting. Heidegger claims that "in the widest sense" the verb ''to call"
refers to setting in motion and getting something underway in a gentle manner; this is the
meaningof''to call" that has its origin in the Greek language. By gathering together the
original meanings of"the call" and ''to call" Heidegger maintains that the word "call"
means: "instruct. demand, allow to reach, get on the way, convey, provide with a way".6$
62IJ!ist.Pg.1I4.
6JllWL.Pg. 116.
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Hcidegger states that we can interpret "'to call" in the habitual manner as "'to
command", yet in doing so we must be mindful that "to command" originally means to
commend, entrust, give to safe-keeping and keep safely." From dUs elucidation o("to
command" Hcidcgger concludes that ''to call" means: "to call into arrival and presence; to
address commcndingly",61 By applying dUs meaning o("to call" to the question ''what
calls for dUnking?" the question becomes: "What is it that enjoins our nature to dUnk, and
thus lets our nature reach thought, arrive in thinking, there to keep it safe~ The call to
think is then a call to bring thinking into presence. As Heidegger has stated, it is in this
manner that the question ''what is called thinking?" should be asked, since this manner of
asking brings together the other three ways ofasking the question. The fourth question is
then revised by Heidegger to read as follows: "What is it that calls on us to think? What
makes a call upon us that we should think and, by thinking, be who we arc~
Section 2./ What "Thinking" signifies
Having clarified the meaning of the verb 'io call" Heidegger moves to the fint
fonnulation ofthe question, which asks what "thinking" and "thought" signifY, in order
to ex.plore what the word ''thinking'' designates. It is Heidegger's intention to move
"nWI. PO. 110.
"IllUlPg.1I8.
"!hi..lL.Pg.1I8.
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beyond a common understaoding of the word ''thinking"to the original meaning of the
word. According to Heidegger common speech views words as temu. Terms consist of
a word-sound that is uttered and a seose-conlenl or signification that attaches 10 the
sound, although the tenn itself is noo_sensuaJ.1O Heidegger refers 10 terms as "buckets or
kegs oul of which we can scoop sense", and this mannerofwlderstanding lenns is
indicative ofour first encounlerwith words, since words are understood as lerms.1l This
first encounter with words is constitutive ofour common interacticn with words. This
common interaction is divorced from an experience ofwords as they are in their essence:
"What we encoun1Cr at first is never what is near, but always only whal is common. It
possesses the unearthly power to break us of the habit of abiding in what is essential,
often so definitively that we never come to abide anywhcre.'tn According 10 Heidegger
when we hear directly what is spoken directly we do not at first hear the words as lerms
or the lenni as sound. This means that we do not hear what is said as il is filtered through
the common meaning ofthe word, this meaning having arisen through man's
manipulation oflanguage. Rather than identifying words with lenns and thus with their
sense-content and word-sound, words are to be lislened to in the speaking oflanguage, as
opposed to the employment of language. Speaking language is more of a letting language
speak through man, than man utilizing language for his expression.
~Pgs.128-129.
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As we are told in Heidegger's essay "Building Dwelling Thinking", man
mistakenly thinks ofb:imselfas the master and shaperoflanguage. In this role as master
aDd shapc:r of Ialguage man covers over the primal meanings of words by using language
forapression, rather than letting language speak 1hrougb him." The original meanings
ofwords~ hidden beneath these"foregmund meanings" creak:d by man, and because of
his misinterpretationofhirnselfas the master oflanguage, language withdraws from
man.1' In examining the meaning ofthe word "thinking" Heidegger is going to tJavel
beneath the foreground meanings and listen to what language originally says in the word
..think". In so doing he returns 10 the origin oflhe word "thinking" in Old English.
The Old English tells us that "thenean ", 'io think" and "t/rancia"", "to thank" are
closely connected. Heidegger notes that the Old English noun for "thought" is "thanc"
or "tIlMc" and that this refers to a grateful thought and the expression ofsuch a thought.
Apparently, traces of this noun can be found today in the word "thanks".'" As Heidegger
says: 1be "thmrc" that which is thought, the thought, implies the !hanks....16 Although
the word "think" can be connected to the word "'thank" Heidegger admits that this does
not reveal the meaning oftbe word 'ihinking". Rather, this connection raises further
Heideggcr, Martin. "Building Dwelling Thinking" from Poeqy LanguaSs.Thought
Trans. Albert Hofstader. NewYorlc:: Harpcrand Row Publishers. 1971. Pg. 146.
l'llililPg.I48.
"Heidcggcr, Whal is Called Thinking? Pg. 139.
16DililPg.l39.
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questions concerning the nature oftbinking as thanking, and the nature ofthinlcing itself:
"'Is thinking a giving ofttwlks?' 'What do thanks mean here?' 'Or do thanks consist in
thinking?' 'What does thinking mean here?'"TI
Not only is thinking related 10 thanking. but memory is also connected 10
thinking. Memory is defined by Heidegger as a gathering of thoughI upon that which
calls us to think. Memory is more than simply recollection, it is rather the gathering of
the recollected thought. Furthermore. in gathering, memory is a keeping within itself that
10 which we must give thought.~ Thus Heidegga- says that thought needs memory since
memory is this gathering of thought. Together with the questions concerning thinking
and thanking we may add questions concerning the nature of memory- is it solely "a
container for the thoughts ofthinking?" and what exactly is the relation between thinking
and memory - does thinking itself reside in memory?"~
The relationship between these words is left open, but Heidegger turns 10 the word
"lhonc" since it is taken as a clue '"that in the speaking ohOOse words the decisively and
originally telling word is the "lhonc".10 The word "thanc" is then contrasled with our
contemporary definition of '"thought". Today a thought is conceived ofas an idea,
notion or opinion, yet the rool word "thanc" refers to '"the gathered, all-gathering thinking
TIIliliLPg.139.
7tlllliLPg. l39.
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thai rccaIls", and this lhioking is related to ooc's disposition orheart·1 The heart lhat
Heidcgger speaks of, be says, is akin to the heart of which Pascal speaks.Q According to
Pascal we can come to know truth. in particular first principles (the c:xistcoce ofspace,
time. movement and number) by the heart. The heart gains knowledge through instinct
and intuition. rather than proving IcDowlcdge by reason. PascaJ maintains that ahbough
we cannot prove by reason wbatthe hem knows instinctively this does not mean that
knowkdge gained by the heart is uncertain; rather it reveals "the feebkness ofour
From this definition of"thanc" that refers to the all-gathering thinking that recalls,
it seems that "thanc" is related to the memory; in fact. Hcideggcr explains that not only
docs "'the tiJanc" mean ooc's disposition orhcart. but '"memory" and"thanlcs" also "move
and have their being in the ',hanc'"." Heidegger claims that originally "memorY" was
not equated with rccollc:ction. but ratbc:r in its origin memory refc:n to one's entire
disposition. as it is intimately focused on things that speak to us "essentially" in
thoughtful meditation. Memory is less a matter ofbcing able 10 recall and more ofa
concentration on and genuine interest in staying with the things that "speak" to us and
IIIhiLPg.139.
I2Jlili1. Pg. 139.
IJpascal, Blaise. ems:n. Trans. Martin Turnell. London: Harvill Press. 1962. Pg. 161.
"Heideggcr, What IJ Called Thinking? Pg. 140.
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concem us." 1ms concentration on things. which is referred to as a "steadfast intimate
concentration", is further emphasized by Heidegger's claim that in its origin "'memory" is
similar to devotion. Heideggu defines devotion as "a constant concentrated abiding with
something...• This abiding with something is not centered solely on what is past, but
with what is in the present and to come as well. Acconting to Heidegger, the past,
present and future: are joined in unity with the memory's own present being. In that
memory is this devotion, and holds 10 that which maintains its concentration, it is able to
recall; yet this ability 10 recall does not overshadow memory's possession of retention.
Heidegger points out that retention by the memory refers to retention of the present and
future as much as of the past, whereas recalling simply refers to calling up the past.
Memory originally means a focused staying with things, and the "tMllC"
originally contains within i:selfthis notion ofmClDOl}'. The "thallc" is theD originally
defined as "the: gathering ofthe constant intcution of everything that the bean holds in
present being..." From this definition Heideggu has drawn together the notion of
memory as the gathering ofthought and memory as devotion. Heidegger defines
"intention" as ""the inclination with which the lnmost meditation ofthe hean twns toward
all that is in being - the: inclination that is not within its own. control and therefore also
"DiliL.Pg.I40.
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ncc:d not necessarily be first c:nac1ed as such.- This is oot the first time that Heidegger
haI"en of"inclination". In lecture I of Part I he explains humankind's inclination to
think and the inclination of that which we thinJc oftoward us. There is a two-way relation
of inclination between ourselves and that to which our thought is directed. A5 Heidegger
explains. we incline only toward something that aJso inclines toward us." That which
inclines toward us does so by "appealing to our essentiaJ being as the kecpc:r who holds
us in out essentiaJ being..... Thus this relation of inclination appears to be based on the
recognition by our essentiaJ being that it is held by that which inclines towards us.
However, this notion of"bolding" is likewise not one-sided, as Heidcgger tells us that
being held is dependent on our holding onto that which holds us and we are able to
maintaiDour hold by maining that which bolds us within our memory.'1 This notion of
inclination as involving two sides seems reinforced by Heidegger's swemc:nt that the
inclination ofthc heart is not within its own control. It seems then that the hean is moved
by Being.
The ",hanc" in relation to thought and memory has now been discussed; what is
left to be considered is the relationship between the ",hanc" and thanks. This relationship
resides in the fact that the "'MIIC", thought of as the memory, can be equaled with the
-JliliL.Pg.141.
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meaning oftbe word "thanks". Giving thanks. according to Heidegger, is an act of the
bean giving thought 10 what it possesses aDd what it is. The heart, inasmuch as it is
memory, not only gives thought, bul also gives itself in thoughl to that which holds its
coocentration.n Tbc:rcby, not only does the heart hold in concentration wtw it is staying
wiltt, but it is held as well. The"'thmc", as the original memory, consists ofthe thin.k.ing
back that devotes what it thinks 10 that about which it thinks. In giving thanks we give
thanks for something that has been given by someone else- a gift. Our essential nature,
which enables us to be who we are, is the highest and most lasting gift we can be given.
We thereby owe thanks for this gift, the gift oflhinking. Heidegger adds that this gift of
thinking is "pledged" 10 what is 10 be given thought, namely Being.'J We are given the
gift of thinking and thinking enab'es us to give thanIu for this gift by giving thought to
that which gives us the gift. Thanking is then thinking: "All ttwWng belongs first and
last in the essential rea1m ofthinlcing.-
Although he has explorcd the word "'memory'" by uncovering its hidden meaning,
Heideggcr asserts that the narure of memory is not named in the wonllhat he has
uncovered. It is rather that the initial meaning ofttUs word mCRly provides us with a
clue." It appears thai memory, Iaken as the bean: and disposition. is a specifically human
tlThid"Pg.141.
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capacity of retaining and recalling. However, memory is oot to be thought of solely in
this narrow sense, since it appears 10 be that which brings together thinking and Being.
Heidcgger explains that the thinking thai recalls "alrcady lives" in the gathering,
constitutive of memory, that has previously kept and keeps hidden that which is to be
thought about. The nature of that which keeps safe and hidden resides in preserving and
conserving. This preserving and conserving is thought of in terms of ''the keep", which
means the custody or guard'" Memory, as the thinking that recalls, resides where thai to
which we give thought is harbored. This dwelling place where memory finds its home is
called the "keeping", and the keeping gives what is to be thought as a gift. However, the
keeping is not distinct from Being, ''the keeping is not something that is apart from and
outside ofwhat is most thought-provoking".t7 Rather, the keeping ilSClf"is the most
thought-provoking thing" and its mode ofgiving.ft Hcidcggcr lells us that the memory
is not only a recalling ofwhal we are 10 give thoughl, but it is also a keeping of that
which we are to give thought. Furthcnnorc, keeping is the essence and fundamental
nature of memory. As Hcidcgger stales: "Memory, as the human recall of what must be
thoughl about, consists in the 'keeping' of what is most thought-provoking. Keeping is
the fundamental nature and essence ofmemory.'099 Thus, not only does memory already
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dwell in the keeping that is Being. but memory is also able to keep Being within it.
Highlighting the fact that memory is not simply a human capacity Heidcgger tells us that
man docs not create the keeping, he onJy dwells within it. The keeping not only
preserves Being, but it also protects it from withdntwing into oblivion, or being denied of
thought 100 However, this is no assurance thai Being will be protected from oblivion,
since, as Hcidcggcrsays. the keeping is not compelled to preserve in this manner.
Evidence ofthis is that Being has withdrawn into oblivion, and this withdrawal can be
traced to the beginning ofWcstem thought.
In retrieving the ancient meanings of the words "lhanc" and "memory" we can
hear what "thinking" tells us through these meanings; but as Heideggcr points out, we
cannot cailthe word "thanc" back into the spoken language, as it would be a
manipulation oflanguage. Therefore Hcidegger states that what is spoken in the word
"thinking"- ",hanc"- remains in the realm of the unspoken.101 This leads to the
conclusion that the wool "thinking" is not detcnnined by what is spoken and unspoken in
the speaking of the word. To inquire into the detennination ofthe word "thinking" we
must turn to the question •......hat is called thinking?" and ask it in terms ofwbat, since
ancient times. has been understood by thinking. IOI Therefore, prior to thinking in
accordance with memory and thanks we must answer the call to think by starting from
'~Pg.151.
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where we stand - thus we must "deliver" ourselves to the call that caUs us to think in
agreement with the logos.,ol This marks the start ofHeidegger's inquiry into the
traditional conception of"thinking", i.e. the second of the four fonnulations ofthe
question about thinking, to which I will now turn.
Section 2.2 llIe traditional conception of "Thinking"
In explicating the origin of what is traditionally conceived ofas thinking,
Heidegger maintains that thinking is traditionally conceived ofas logic and that when we
go back to the Greek we find that "logic" is an abbreviation of the Greek title: "the
understanding that concerns the logos", i.e. "episteme logilre".I04 Logos is a noun and the
verb to which it COIRSpOnds., which is legein, signifies "saying something about
something". The logos is then "the assertion ofsomething about something", and by
association with logic as the doctrine of the logos, thinking is given the same
definition. lOS Speech is then fundamental to thinking, and this presupposes that that
which is to be the subject of the assertion must be something which can be spoken about.
More to the point, what the assertion says, the predicate of the assertion, must be
compatible with the subject of the assertion. As Heidcgger explains, it cannot be asserted
IOlIhi.t.Pg.165.
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that a trianglc laughs because "trianglc" and "Iaughtcr" are not compatiblc. I06
Hcidcgger maintains that it is csscntialto the realization ofour destiny that wc
becomc aware ofthc thinJcing that has been dominated by thc logos. Hc slates that:
As long as wc ourselves do not set out fiom where wc are, that is,
as long as wc do not open ourselves 10 the call and, with this question,
get underway toward the call -just 50 long wc shall remain blind to
the mission and destiny ofour nature. IOT
Setting oul from where we are requires understanding how wc camc to where wc are, and
this in tum requires looking back:. Thc question that guides Heidcgger's look back is:
why il is that for Greek thinking, which dctcnnincs thinking, evcn up to the present,
'1hinking" receives its essential character from "saying" and logoIl? Hcidegger
concludes from this that the one and only thing thai is decisive for the saying of the logOIl,
which isstiJl considered to be the basic character of thinking. is the call which has called
thinking and still calls thinking "inlo its long-habituated nature".IOl The question thai
then guides Heidcgger's inquiry into the traditional conception of''thinking'' is: "what is
the calling that has directed and is still directing us into thinking in the sense ofthc
predicative IOgosr'1119
Heideggcr points out that this question is not an historical question, "in the sense
ofnarrativc history", nor is il a world-historical question - it does not focus on an
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occunence as a chain ofevents. IIO Thus Heidegger's inquiry, as lead by this question, is
rather an historical re-thinking of the call that direclS us into thinking in the manner of the
logos. However, this re-thinking is not simply a returning to the Greek origin of the word
''thinking'' and formulating ideas about it. Rather, Heidegger characterizes this inquiry in
terms ofa submitting and delivering ourselves 10 this calL III He further goes on 10 refer
to the inquiry as that which allows one to be open to the call and to get "undetway toward
the cail".1Il In fact, Heidcgger refers to thinking -- and this is the context in which we
are to understand his inquiry as a historical re-thinking - as a way; it is a way that we
respond 10 by getting and remaining underway in order to clear the way. Heidegger
distinguishes between clearing and setting out on the way. and taking up a position
somewhere along the way in order to merely talk about it. It is essential then, that we set
out on the way. and thus walk the way. rather than speculate about it. As Heidegger says:
"Only when we walk it. and in no other fashion, only. that is, by thoughtful questioning,
are we on the move on the way. This movement is what allows the way to come
forward.tlllJ
In asking the question "what is called thinking?" we are thinking in the manner of
getting underway. However. although Heidegger chanlcterizes the inquiry into the
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second question, which asks after the call that directs us into thinking in terms or the
logos, as a questiooing that gets us uodc:rw"ay, it appears that this inquiry is not so much a
getting underway as a Itoppin& beside the way in order 10 talk about il Although
Heidegger wants his readers 10 walk the way it seems that there is a rift between walking
the way aDd explaining or revealing the way. This is evident with his c:ommcnt thai the
anempllo ask the question "what is called thinking'" in the second mode orasking il
inevitably begins 10 look as though it is a "historical consideration ortbe begjrmings or
Western philosophy".II. Heideggcr responds to this staring: "We shall let it go at that,
not because we are indifferent to that impression, but because it cannot be dispelled by
talking about it instead orsetting out on the way ofour question...115 There is, then, a
difference between setting out on the way that is thinking, and trying to convey to others
how this way begins with the Greeks. Setting oul on the way involves diRctJy
experiencing the call, while in trying 10 convey the way to others this experience cannot
be replicated.
When Hcidegger Ioob back to the thinkers oftbe beginning orwestem thought
this rift between experiencing, or walking the way, and speaking about the way becomes
apparent As he points out, the beginning is not to be thoughl of merely historically as
the first instaoce wherein the question orthe calling was raised; rather, the beginning is
the beginning because these thinkers "experienced" the claim orthe calling by responding
1I·Thist.Pg.167.
I'SImsL Pg. 167.
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to it in thoUght.II' These thinkers were then underway; sent on their way, in fact, by
being addressed by Being as that which is to be given thought .117 Yet Heide~c1aims
that in the address the source ofthe call3flPC8rS, but not in its "full radiance" or lmder the
same name. Heidcgger tells us that before investigating the calling that calls all Western
and European thinking we must "try to listen to an early saying which gives us evidence
how much early thought generally responds to a call, yet without naming it, or giving it
thought, as such."ll' This saying is from fragment # 6 (lflhe writing (lfParmcnides, and
is usually translated as follows: "One should holh say and think that Being is''.1l9 As
previously mentioned this inquiry inevitably appears as an hist(lrical dcscripti(ln, yet
Heidegger tells us that although it would be in "keeping with the way" if we tried to
"trace in thought" what the saying tells us, it seems explanation and talk, instead of
simply walking the way, is necessary. Thus Heidcgger states:
But today, when we know much too much and f(lrm opin.i(lns much
too quickly, when we compute and pigeonhole everything in a flash-
today there is no room at all left for the hope that the prcsentati(ln
ofa maner might in itselfbe powerful enough to set in motion any
fellow-thinlcing which, prompted by the showing ofthe malter,
W()uld join us on our way. We therefore need these bothersome
detours and crutches that otherwise run counter to lhe style of
thinking ways. This is the necessity to which we bow when we now
attempt, by circUJt15Cribing the matter in ever narrower circles, to
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render possible the: leap into what the: saying tells us. lZO
To render the: leap into what the: saying tells us will not be possible without
lranslating the saying and translation does not occur without interpretation. Heidegger
points out that we give attention to the saying while we are wuJerway. on the way the
question "what calls on us to think in the manner ofthe logos" provides. However, this
question innuences how we look at the saying, as an interpretation ofit will be filtered
through the question; thereby the translation and interpretation will not be completely
objective. Furthermore. Heidegger suggests that although attempts may be made to put
aside presuppositions and references to other philosophical texts when carrying out an
interpretation, these attempts ultimately fail. This leads Heidegger to comment on the
fact that no interpretation is objective. including an interpretation of the saying in
question. III Since an interpretation of the saying will not be objective Heidegger is lead
to question how we are to translale the saying. His answer to this is that there is one way
open for translation: "Without regard to later philosophy and its achievement in
interpreting this thinker. we shalllJy to listen to the saying, so to speak, in the first bloom
of the WOrds."lll Heidegger also provides a clue as to how his translation, and the
accompanying interpretation, will proceed, in his explanation ofhow an interpretation is a
dialogue with the work to be interpreted:
l:toniliL.Pg.171.
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Every interpretation is a ctialogue with the work, and with the saying.
However, every dialogue becomes halting and fruitless ifit confines
itselfobdurately to nothing but what is directly said - rather than that
the speakers in the dialogue involve each other in that realm and
abode about which they are speaking, and lead each other to it. Such
involvement is the soul ofthe dialogue. It leads the speakers into the
unspoken.1u
Thus Heidegger's translation and interpretation will be a dialogue with Pannenides'
saying wherein Heidegger will be lead into the realm from which the call that calls
thinking in the manner of the logos is made.
To begin his translation and interpretation Heideggerinserts colons within the
saying to emphasize its word structure; he also divides the saying onto four separate lines.
By inserting colons and dividing the saying onto separate lines the translation is "fitted.
more closely now to tbeGreek text".ll. In being more closely litted to the Greek text
Heidegger can begin his dialogue with Parmenides. The usual translation ofthe saying is
still "One should both say and think that being is", but Heidegger renders the saying, now
with colons inserted and on separate lines as:
''Needful:
The saying also thinking too:
Being:
Tobe.,,11J
Heidegger in fact refers to this rendering of the saying as "our saying" and points out that
by inserting colons into the saying the order of the words appears. In "our saying", as
lDnrnLPg.178.
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opposed to the USuallranslation. the words appear side by side without connection by
other words. In the usuallJ'al1Slation: "One should both say and think. that Being is" the
words "both" and "that" give the words in the saying a specific order. The lack of
connector words in Ibc: original Greek, which is the reason Heidegger inserts colons. is
evidence ofthe saying's parataetie. (i.e. side - "pora'), rather than syntQctie nature.
Heidegger states that paratactic sentence structures are found in the languages of
primitive people and children. 116 The implication is. then. that as a pre-Socratic thinker
Parmenides is "downgraded" by comparison with PIaIo. Il7 Although paratactic sentence
structures arc indicative of primitiveness and lack the sophistication of syntactical
language, Heidegger insists that in this case paratactic does not refer to pre-syntactic or
primitive. III lnsIead Heidegger maintains that although the word order may possess a
paratactic fonn. the content of the saying moves beyond its fonn because it "speaks
where there arc no words. in the fields between the words which the colons indicate..•'19
Therefore. although the fonn of the saying is parataetic, the content of the saying is not
dependent on the form and thus speaks with the sophistication Ofsynlactic language.
Following Parmenides' language word for word. Heidegger starts with the word.
usually translated as ''needful'' and reaches into the origins of the words in order to fully
U'Ihisl.Pg. 183.
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elucidate them. It seems that the Greek word translated as '''needful'' comes from a verb
whicb means "I handle and so keep in hand, [use, I have use for".'X1 By investigating
the nature of"using" it is revealed that ''usc'' does not refer to utilizing and exploiting,
001 rather the nature of"using" lies in handling, Through lhe notion of"handling", "usc"
implies a "fitting response", as handling requires that the band which handles a thing
must fit that lhing. Not only does '''usc'' imply "a fitting response", but it also consists in
leaving that which is being used in its essential nature, In fact, it is only proper use which
carries the thing it is using to its essential nature and keeps it there. From this we see thai
in using something we are actually bringing it to and lcuing it enler its essential nature,
and keeping it safe there as well. III According 10 Heidegger "use itself is the summons
which demands that a thing be admitted to its own essence and nature, and that the use
keep to i1."m In this manner proper use is something beyond the capacity of man, in that
it is only Being which can let a thing enter into its essential nature. Thus, Heidegger now
renders the word "needful" within the initial translation as "It is useful".IJ)
The initial translation of the saying tells us that what is useful is ''the Slating, so
thinking too",llf Heideggcr stales that the Greek words /egein and noein are translated
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correctly in accordance with the dictionary as "to state" and "to think" respectively.
However, this translation is not accurate. As Hcidegger stales:
We simply do not notice what violence and crudity we commit
with the usual translation, precisely because it is correct according
to the dictionary, how we twn everything upside down and throw it
inlo confusion. It docs nol even occur 10 us that in the end, or here
better in the beginning ofWestcm thinking, the saying ofParmenides
speaks to us for the lirst time of what is called thinking. llS
If we jump ahead and usc the word ''thinking'' in the translation, we arc assuming that the
Greek Icxt has already established what thinking is, when in fact it "only leads up to the
nature ofthinking".IJ6 Therefore, "thinking" cannot be the translation of legein by itself
or noein by itself. Heidcggcr points out that although within logic, the theory of the
logos,legein and noein imply thinking, properly to translate Pannenidcs' saying we
must look back to a time prior to the logos. In so doing we inquire into the call thai
called legei" and "oein into their natures as thinking conceived of in relation to logic. As
Hcidegger states:
... we arc inquiring back into the past, are asking for that call which
was lirst to summon legei" and "oei" to that nature which, subsequently,
restricts itsclflO a mode whosedctennination will be ruled by logic as
the essence ofthinking. 1l7
To emphasize further that the usual translation is inaccurate, that legei" and noei"
should not carelessly be translated as "stating" and "thinking", Heidegger examines the
'lS.lllliL.Pg.I96.
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pcculiarorder ofthe words in the usual translation. According to the usual translation
what is needful isfirst the saying tlren the thinking that being is. However, it is much
more likely that the sentence be given thought first, then stated. Yet as the saying
proclaims. it is the stating. then the thinking. that "consti1Ute what admits the 'it is useful'
into its essence and there holds it".uI The order of the words is central to the meaning of
"it is useful", yet the order itself is contrary to a practical application of the saying. To
resolve this problem Heidegger moves beyond the usual translations of legein as "stating"
and noein as'ihinJcing". The usual translation interprets "stating" and "'thinking" as they
are commonly understood, "stating" as mere speaking and "thinking" as logic. In moving
beyond the usual translation it is discovered that "stating" does not in fact refer to 'io
speak" or to language, but rather that the Greek for "stating" is the same as our word
"lay... Il9 Heidegger asserts that for the Greeks "stating" was understood as a "laying out,
laying before, laying to... I.... Laying something out consists in making it lie so that it may
lie before us. What is of importance to this "laying" is not the act of setting something up
so that it may lie before us, but rather it is that that which lies before us has set itself up,
has settled into its situation and is lying before us. In accordance with this. that which
lies before us appears and comes forward on its own. Heidegger states that the things that
UfDili!..Pg.198.
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lie before us arc "supremely close by".••1 In fact, they arc "what has come close by,
beforehand", yet we usually do not sec them "in their presence".141 "Laying" can be
connected to "stating" in the sense that saying something about something makes that
thing lie before us and thereby appear, Heidegger asserts that the "rnaking·to-appear"
and the "Ietting-Iie·before-us" is the essence ofstating and the logOJl. I4J Translating
stating in this manner Parmenides' saying now runs: "II is useful: to lay, to let lie before
us",·'"
Having properly translated legein Heidegger moves on to noein. Noein is
translated with "perceive", but Heidegger cautions that "perceive" must not be taken as
an exact translation, especially if perceive is thought ofas the perception of something.
According to Heideggcr "perceive" is to be equaled with "receive". This equation makes
reference to Kant's philosophy wherein perception refers to being receptive 10 sense
impressions. When it is understood as reception, perception is passive, and to be
distinguished from an active perception, since active perception entails holding
preconceived notions of, or attitudes loward, that which is pen:eived,141 Thus Heidegger
explains:
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Noein so translated - to usc a Kantian distinction for the sake of
convenience - is pointing toward perception in the sense ofreceptivity,
as distinguished from the spontaneity with which we asswne this or that
attitude toward what we perceive. I_
However, this perception is also to be distinguished from passive acceptance. Perception,
we are told. is reception. yet it also includes the active trait of undertaking something.
This active trait of undertaking something consists in aooncem with that which is
perceived. This concern leads to talcing up and doing something with the thing perceived.
What we do with what we have perceived and where we take it is very specific: we lake it
to heart, and keeping it at heart we leave it exactly the way it is. I•7 Thus by Heidegger's
translation noein is "taking something 10 heart"; furthermore, now, which is the noun to
the verb noein, originally means almost exactly what Heidegger has explained as the
meaning of t/wne, devotion and memory.lq According to Heidegger devotion and
memory are brought together in his definition oft/wne. Hcidegger defines thane as the
gathering of the constant intention ofeverything the heart holds in present being. I~
When legein and noein are understood as letting lie and taking to heart the
phenomenological aspects ofHeidegger's thought become apparent. Heidegger has
explained that in laying it is of extteme importance that what is laid has already come to
lie before us. He states:" . what lies before us is primary, especially when it lies there
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before all the laying and setting that are man's work. when it lies there prior to all that
man lays out, lays down. or lays in ruin,,,UIl By letting things lie before us as they lie, we
are able to see things as they are in themselves, in their ttuth, prior to all the laying that
man cames out. Laying can then be seen as "a relatedness that petVades man's stay on
this earth Iiom the growxl Up",l'l What lies before us in the widest sense can be referred
10 as the ground level and in the widest sense it can be designated with "'there is",'n
Noe;n can be related to a phenomenological seeing and to legein because it is a thinking
that pen:eives beforehand by taking 10 mind and bean. The heart, according to
Heidegger, is a wardship thai guards what lies before us and keeps it as it is, Heidegger
also claims that noein refers to scenting, which for man is divination. Heidegger tells us
that authentic divination "is the mode in which essenrials (my italics) come to us and so
come to mind, in order that we may keep them in mirnJ...lll Heidegger describes this
divination as "the great hall where everything that can be known is kepI, concealed",
rather than being the "outer court before the gates oCknowledge", I~ This description
reveals that taking to heart and mind, as man's scenting or divination, is an intuitive or
immediate knowledge that sees things and knows them prior to the application of logic or
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reason. Just as animals simply put their noses in the air or on the ground and receive
various smells., so too does man. when he is divining, simply let his divining rod lead him
to water. In divining man becomes an open vessel, waiting to receive the appropriate
sign from the divining rod which indicates thepresencc ofwatcr. Thus it seems that in
equating divination with the scenting ofanimals Hcidegger is telling us that man's
scenting, his manner ofbecoming aware ofand knowing the world around him, is, as a
taking to heart and mind, an intuitive and immediate reception of things that lie before us
as they appear. Phenomenologically spealcing this reception of things that lie before us
as they appear occurs prior to any interference by theoretical or scientific concepts, prior
10 any "laying" that man carries out. Noein, as divination, allows man to be open 10 the
things around him as they simply appear before him; as such divination is the great hall
that allows man 10 encounter everything that is kept within it. What is useful is then to
let things lie before us as they are and come to know them in their truth as what they are.
Pannenides' saying is now translated as: "Useful is the letting-lie-before-us also (the)
talring.to-hearttoo".l"
With the translations of"saying" and '"thinking" Heidegger reveals that stating and
thinking penetrate each other. Firstly, stating, as letting-lie-before-us, '"unfolds of its own
accord" into thinking. l56 According 10 Hcidegger, when we let something lie before us
we are already keeping it in mind and heart, and thereby we have already taken it 10 heart.
l"lliliLPg.207.
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Conversely, thinking is always a stating, in that taking to heart what lies before us means
that we "take it as it is lying".U1 Taking to heart is thereby a gathering in two ways: we
gather ourselves 10 whallies before us and we gather what lies before us to itselfwben we
take it 10 heart. Gathering it 10 itself, that which lies before us is able to become manifest
in terms ofbow it lies before us. UI Stating and thinking are then involved in a give and
take relalionship and each penetrates the other. With the establishment of the relation
between stating and thinking the saying is translated as follows: "the letting-lie-before-us
such (as thiS), the taking-ta-heart too (such as theother)."I59
The saying is then put together with the tinal words "being" and "to be" and the
tinal tr.mslation is read: "Useful is: letting-Iie-before-us and so (the) taking-to-heart too:
being: to be."I60 According to Heidegger the Greek words eon (being) and emmenai (to
be) not only belong together but also designate the same thing. In fact, Heidegger
infonns us that Parmenides uses the word eon for emmenai, thus the translation ends with
a repetition ofthe word eon. Heidegger rectifies this apparent redundancy, and
illuminates how ''being'' and ''to be" belong together, by pointing out that ''being''
ne<:essarily has two meanings because it is a participle. Grammatically, a word that is a
participleparticipatcs in two meanings that refer to each other; one of these meanings is
IS1.1lWL.Pg.209.
ISI.IlWL.Pg.209.
IS'I.!lllit.Pg.209.
'~Pg.217.
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nominal and the other is verbal. For example, the word "blossoming" can mean either
that which is blossoming, a rosebush. or the act ofblossoming.161 As a participle "being"
means a being and something which is in being. Heidegger questions why participles
have two meanings and his answer is that it is not because they participate in two
meanings., but rather that participles are participles because "what they state is always
applied to what is in itselftwofold".IW The participle ''being'' is that which is in itself
twofold, and the dual meanings ofall other participles emerge from the twofold nature of
''being'': "The dual meaning of participles stems from the duality ofwhat they tacitly
designate. But this dualism in its tum stems from a distinctive duality that is concealed in
the word eon, being."I6J Tbe twofoldness ofthe participle ''being'' consists in the
following dualism: that a being has its being in Being and Being is the Being ofa being.
Thus, just as "blossoming" refers to something that is blossoming and the act of
blossoming, ''being'' refers to the noun Being and the verbal designation "in Being".
Rather than returning to the grammatical or logical origin of the concept of
participle, Heidegger traces the history of the participle back to Plalo's dialogue the
"Sophist", where it is central to Plato's thinking. Within this dialogue participation refers
to the participation ofa being in its idea. The idea enables the being to appear as a
particular being becausethc idea is the face and fonn oftbe being. When the being
161DiliL. Pg. 220.
lltl.IhiJL.Pg.221.
16JIliliLPg.221.
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appears it is "in present being>; thus we can say of the being that "it is... l " For Plato the
idea constitules the Being ofa being, and the relation ofa given being to an idea is
participation. Heidegger points out that the participation ofa being in Being presupposes
the existence oflbe duality ofbeing and Being. The predominant question ofthe history
of philosophy emerges from this duality as "what is the particular being in its BeingT'
and, remaining with this question, Western·European thinking moves from beings to
Being.l~ The particular being is transcended in order to reach the Being in which the
particular being is. Starting with the Greeks the particular being is thought ofas aligned
with the physical. lbisquestion of what the particular being is in its Being leads to
metaphysics, wherein the particular physical being is transcended. This transcendence
from the particular physical being to the metaphysical realm of Being reinforces and
furthers the duality between being and Being. Since the participation ofbeings in Bring
presupposes a duality between the two, the duality ofbeings and Being must be what first
lies before us and is taken to heart, prior 10 a consideration ofthe one in the other. l66 In
that the saying tells us that thinking means "Ietting-Iie-before-us and so laking-to-hean
also: beings in being", the saying goes to the heart of the duality ofbeings and Being that
founds metaphysics.
Heidegger slates that looked at grammatically, and thus "seen from the outside",
I..nmt. Pg. 222.
16'niliL. Pg. 222.
I~Pg.223.
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Pannenidcs' saying tells us to "take to heart being as participle and with it take heed ofto
be in Being, the Being ofbeings."'67 From this grammatical and determining standpoint
the duality itself, of Being and to be, is oot inquired into or given thought. What is
instead given thought is the question of what beings are in their Being, with beings as the
focal point, and thus the duality is thought of within metaphysics as simply "beings.in-
being". Therefore, the t1Unking that follows the call that calls us to think beings in being
refers to: "letting lie before us and so taking to heart also: beings in being."l(" This
grammatical interpretation of"being" and "0 be" gives rise to the belief that we can
know what these words mean by looking to beings in the world. Heidegger explains that
it seems that we know, or profess to know what "being" and "to be" mean. Yet when we
stop and reflect on it we discover that we do DOl know because we do not know how to
represent "being" and "to be" to ourselves. Even though we cannot represent "being" and
''to be" we believe that clarification can arise by pointing to a being. The pointing, it
turns out, merely indicates that which we are pointing to, and 001 "being".I69 Heidegger
explains this as follows:
And yet, to make clear what "to be" says we need only point to some
being - a mountain, a house lying before us, a tree standing there.
What do we point out when we help ourselves by such indications?
We indicate a being, ofcourse; but strictly speaking the indication
comes to rest on the mountain, the house, the tree. Now we imagine
that we have the answer to precisely what is still in question. For we
161lhid. Pg. 224.
16I1J:llii,Pg.. 224.
l"1bid.Pg.225.
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do not, after al~ inquire about a being as mountain, as house, as tree,
as though we wanted to climb a mountain, move into a house, or
plant a tree. We inquire about the mountain, about the house, about
the tree as a given being, in order 10 give thought to the being of the
mountain, the being ofthe house, the being of the tree.
We notice at once, il is true, that being is not attached to the
mountain somewhere, or stuck to the house, or hanging from the
tree. We notice, thus, the problematic that is designated with "being".
Our question therefore becomes more questioning. We let beings, as
beings., lie before us and give our heart and mind to the ''being'' of
particularbeings.1'1O
Since ''being'' and "to be" point us toward beings, as long as we accept "being"
and "to be" as the tnlnslation of the Greek we will not be able to hear what the saying is
telling us. Heidegger claims that what is needed is for us to "pass over into the Greek
sphere" of''beings'' and "to be" rather than simply transposing.111 Heidegger maintains
that when we attempt to sufficiently tnlnslate the words "being" and "to be" we are
anempting to "take to heart That which calls on us to think", and thereby we are asking
the question "what is called thinking?" in the fourth sense: "What is That which calls on
us to think, by so disposing the conjunction ofstating and thinking that it relates to 1tT'1'7l
Thus "being" and "to be" direct /egein and noein into the nature ofthinlcing and thereby
they constitute the fundamental nature of thinking.
l~ Pgs. 225.226.
I1lIhUL.Pg.226.
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Section 2. J TIre phenomenological "leap ofvision ..
The duality ofbeings and Being is the focus ofthe last stagesofHeidegger's
retranslation of Pannenides' saying. Rather than providing a detailed exegesis ofthis
final stage I will simply summarize it, as it is rather lengthy and not entirely necessary to
provide a complete exegesis. Although Heidegger translates the Greek "being" (eon) and
'io be" (emmenai) into the English "being" and 'io be" he tells us that this does not get
to the heart of what the Greek words mean when heard with Greek ears. Thus we must
u-anspose ourselves with a "leap ofvision" into the Greek sphere. I7l However, even with
a leap of vision into the Greek sphere the meaning of"being" is elusive and not easily
articulated. Rc:caIl at this point that Heidegger has previously alluded to this leap. Prior
to his translation and interpretation ofPannenides' saying Heidegger told us that the
attempt to interpret and translate this saying is the attempt to ''render possible the leap
into what the saying tells us".17~ But Heidegger's translation and interpretation has taken
us as far as it can reach and now we must attempt this leap ourselves.
The leap ofvision which sees what is heard by the word "being" appears to be a
phenomenological "seeing" somewhat akin to Husserl's phenomenology, Husser! being
the philosopher who schooled Heideggcr in phenomenology. Husserl's
phenomenological method, as presented in his work The Crisis peW European Sciences
and Transcendental Phenomenology consists in an attempt to reach the subjective ground
I7lI!mL. Pg. 232.
17tI!iliL.Pg.l7l.
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of tile sciences, a ground whicb has not been investigated by the sciences but rather-has
been presupposed. Thus this subjective ground, or life·world, which is pre--given to
science and thereby presupposed by science, is that on which the sciences have been
grounded. The life-world is the prcgiven horizon and ground of validity for objective
science.l~ It is the sensibly and immediately experienced. world. In relation to science
the life-world is the purely intuitive ''merely subjcctive-relative".I76 That which is
immediately and intuitively experienced in the life-world is presented, and thereby
experienced, in an original self-givenness or self-evidence. Objects that become
calculated, measured and subjected to scientific investigation are originally given in an
immediate self-givenness which presents them as how they appear prior to being thought
ofas scientific data. Huss.=r1's phenomenological method begins with a reduction to the
life-world, but it moves beyond the life-world to the transcendental realm. Heidegger,
being a student ofHusserl's" was in agreement with the need for a reduction to the
pregiven and ~upposedfoundation ofthe sciences. In~ Heidegger
refers to this reduction as an ontological inquiry into the Being ofcertain areas ofentities.
However, for Heidegger this ontological inquiry itself remains "naive and opaque if in its
researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning ofBeing in general."m
Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
Trans. David Carr. United States: Northwestern University Press. 1970. Pg.123.
I~usserl. Pg.12S.
mHeidegger,~. Pg.31.
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Hei~ refers to this clarification oftbe meaning of Being as ontology's "fundamental
wk... '11 For Heidegger phenomenology, as "fundamental ontology" is to investigate not
only the Being ofentities, but the meaning of Being itself. In doing so phenomenology
lays the foundations ofthe sciences. '79 1be phenomenological "seeing" Heidegger
speaks ofin What Is Called Thinking? appears to be a seeing that reaches beyond the
Being of particular entities to the meaning of Being itself.
In his book, Heidegger's Phi!osophy ofaeing Herman Philipse elaborates on the
differences between the phenomenology ofHusserI and Heidegger. To begin with, for
Husserl phenomenology is a science which studies transcendental consciousness and its
intentional correlates - beings in their constitution by transcendental consciousness.
However, for Heidegger, phenomenology is to describe the ontological constitution of
different kinds ofbeings. In particular Heidegger focuses on human existence. thus his
phenomenology focuses on bringing to light the essential structures of human existence
as they are experienced pre-theoretically and unscientifically. Philipse identifies four
elements to Husserl's phenomenology, as Husserl conceives of it in Ideas I. These four
elements are as follows: I) phenomenology is purely descriptive and avoids theorizing; 2)
phenomenological description of the way entities are "constituted in" transcendental
consciousness is an ontological explanation of their mode of being; this emerges from 3)
the constitution ofentities in consciousness is the "being" ofthese entities; and 4)
17IIhid:.Pg.3L
179.DWL.Pg.30.
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transcendental phenomenology is an eidetic discipline in that it tries to reach the essential
structures ofentities.110 Philipse reports that in section 1 of Being and Tjme wherein
Heidegger provides his description ofphenomenology, Heidcgger endorses I, 2 and 4,
but rejccts Husserl's transccndcnla1 idealism (3). This rejection occun because
Heidegger views transcendental idealism as a solution to the problem of the external
world. Heidegger takes issue with the problem ofthe external world because he
maintains that when we look at human existence pre-theoretically. we will see that human
existence and the world are not separable.
The problem oftbe external world arises through the useofconceplS such as
consciousness. substance and material object, which are not based on a pre-theoretical
experience of life. but ruther on a Cartesian scientific conception of the world.• '1 These
scientific conceptions allow the problem ofthe external world to arise because they allow
for a separation of human existence and world. Heidegger asserts that human existence,
or Dasein, is not a consciousness in a body maneuvering through a collection ofentities
that make up the world; ruther, Dasein is a whole person and Dasein's world is
inseparable from it since the world is in fact a constitutive structure ofDasein. Dasein's
being is primarily "being-in-the-world" and the world can be thought ofas consisting in a
Philipse. Hmoan. Hejdegm's PbjlosgphyoCBejng. New Jersey: Princelon University
Prcss. 1998.Pg. 111.
lliphilipse. Pg.111.
.,
meaningful structun: provided through Daseill's relations to the things in the world.112
Therefore, not only do the traditional concepts not reach an experience ofeveryday life.,
but the problem of the external world, to whicb these concepts can be applied, function to
separate man from his world as they do not allow him to be seen essentially as being-in-
the--wor1d.
Philipse maintains that Heidegger's rejection of Husserl's transcendental idealism
can be viewed as a ''radicalization'' ofHusserI's principle of theory-free description. III
By rejecting Husserl's transcendental idealism Heidegger is rejecting the philosophical
tradition from which Husserl's transcendental idealism emerged (the tradition of
Cartesian epistemology) and the scientific concepts that penneate it. By this rejection
Heidegger rules out any infection by these scientific and theoretical concepts in his
e~loration ofthe way ordinary life is experienced.I" The method ofphenomenology
Heidegger presents in~ occurs by letting "that which shows itself be seen
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself'. lIS Philipse maintains that
the subject matter ofHeidegger's phenomenology is being, thought of as the ontological
constitution ofspecific kinds ofbeings. l16 However. as previously stated, in lkin&...Im!.
lnphilipse. Pg. 25.
IUphilipse. Pg. 118.
I"Philipse.Pgs.117.118.
I"Heidegger,~.Pg.58.
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~ Heidegger refers to phenomenology as "fundamental ontology" since it is to
investigate the meaning of Being in generaL Hcidcgger's pbenomenology seems to move
beyond pre-theoretical descriptions oftbe ontological constitution ofcertain beings to an
attempt to reach Being as the process of nonconccalment.
Thus it appears that Hcidcgger's "radicalization" ofHusscrl's theory-free
description is even more radical with the introduction of the notion ofthe "leap of
vision", which can be referred to as a pbenomenological seeing that sees that which
cannot be easily described at all, let alOM pre-theoretically. It can possibly be asserted
that description becomes secondary to the actual experience of viewing, as Heidegger
himself stales that in the leap of vison it is the looking that is decisive rather than puning
what is seen into words"" This view to Being, then, requires a "leap" ofvision which
seems to rest more on having faith in what one is seeing than on empirical facts or reports
of what has been seen. In facl, Hcidegger tells us that what has been seen in a leap of
vision cannot be demonstrated by reason but can only be proven by being seen again.
Thus he states that the seeing in a leap of vision "is more thanjust the seeing with the
eyes ofthe body".lll
These descriptions of the leap of vision reinforce what has been previously
mentioned of the rift between direct experience, whicb corresponds to thinking as a
setting out on the way, and explaining or talking whicb merely take up a position along
111Heidegger, What [s Called Thinking? Pg. 233.
1UThilL. Pg.232.
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the way. When we think in the manner Hcidegger puts forward we set out on the way
and remain underway. Wecaonot compel otbm to think by describing or explaining our
getting underway,ODe must simply walk the way (oroocsclr. Heideggertells us in Part I
ofWb!l Is Called Thinking" that man is a pointer, pointing toward Being's withdBwal.
We point towards Being's withdrawal because we are drawn toward and into it, and in
being drawn toward it we point toward it. In fact, Heidegger tells us that man's essential
nature lies in being a pointer.I" Can we extend this to Heidegger himself and suggest
that Heidegger is attempting to be a pointer, pointing toward the withdrawal of Being,
and in so doing pointing toward the way ofthinking? As a pointer who is drawn toward
Being Heidegger can walk the way himself, and hope that his walking becomes a
pointing for others. However, to put his walking into words seems to be in vain, as he
tells us himself that one must walk the way for oneselr.
In fact, from whal: Heidegger says, it appears that to put one's getting underway
into words one's only recourse is to poetry. In reference to his assertion that man is a
pointer Heidegger discusses a fl:W lines from a poem written by Hoeldertin. Heidegger
tells us that a possible title for the poem in question was "M"emosyrte", which translales
from the GRek into "Memory". Heideggcr then proceeds to tell us what we now know of
memory: that it is the gathering ofthougbt, the gathering ofm:ollc:ction, upon what
demands to be thought and that it keeps concealed within, that to which thought must be
I"nWLPg.9
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given. ItO However, Heideggcr also informs us that memory is the ..thinking back to what
is to be thought is the source and ground ofpoesy".I.1 Since memory is the source and
ground ofpoesy, poesy is able to flow back toward the source and think in the manner of
a thinking back and recollecting.'t! Thus Heidegger concludes: "Poetry wells up only
from devoted thought thinking back, recollecting,,,ltl From this statement it appears that
poetry is connected to, but separate from thinking that is underway, Furthennore, if
there is to be any articulation of being on the way then it seems that poetry may be this
articulation. This would explain Heidegger's references to the poetry ofHoelderlin,
s<:anered throughout the text, and his conunents that allude 10 poetry being able to show
us the way to thinking. As he says., Hoclderlin's poetry "may summon us with a larger
appeal, and bence greater allure, upon a way ofthought that tracks in thought what is
most thought-provoking". I,. However, the text What Is Called, Thinking? is not a work
ofpoctry, although at times Heidegger's writing can be thought ofas poetic, and if
Heidegger is to point the way toward thinking in this lexl he must resort to using
1"llWl Pgs. 10-11.
1911hiJ1.Pg.11.
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language which explains., rather than poetizes."5
Since the meaning of"being" as seen within the leap of vision depends entirely
upon the seeing and is not easily rendered by language, Heidegger tells us that when we
by to eltpress what the leap sees the expression appears as a mere assertion made on a
wlUm. Although it may appear to be an arbitrary assertion, Heidegger attempts to put
into language what the leap sees hy suggesting that the Greek words for "being" and "to
be" refer to "what is present" and "to be present".I'N "Present" means something that is
present. in the sense ofpresent to us. Moreover, "present" and "presence" mean "what is
with us", and in tum this means "to endure in the encounter".I9'I For the Greeks being
present and abiding are not thought ofsimply as duration. Rather, they are thought of in
terms orcoming close by, as opposed to being away. Presence is then a spatial presence
instead ofa temporal presence. One can lhen ask of this manner ofconceiving presence:
''when does the presence come closer and what does it come closer to?" Heidegger
explains that what is present is so by virtue of its rise from unconcealment. Furthennore,
in that it has risen from unconcealment. what is present has entered into that which has
It is worthwhile to point out that although poetry and phenomenology, as a "leap of
vision", appear to be the same, for Heidegger they are not. In his references to
HoeldeTlin's poems and from what he has explained of poetry, it seems that for him
poetry and phenomenology are two distinct methods of trying to reach Being. However,
the distinction appears to be as subtle as to rest on the fact that phenomenology, as a "leap
of vision" is something akin to faith, while poetry is not.
I~Pg.233.
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already risen from unconccalmcnt. the unconcealed. Taking a mountain range as an
example, the mountains rise from uncoocea1ment into the unconcealed landscape. and
thereby the mountains are present. Yet Heidegger explains further that although that
which is present has risen from UDConcea1ment. the rise fi'om unconcealment is itselfnot
apparent. As Hei.degger says:
But this rise from unconcealment. as the entry into what is unconcealed,
does not specifically come to the fore in the presence of what is present.
It is part ofprescnce to hold back these traits, and thus to let come out
only that which is present. Even. and in particular. that unconccalment
in which this rise and entry lakes place, remains concealed, in contrast to
the unconcealed present things. I"
Heidegger then returns to the saying ofParmenides and applies the translation of
"prcscncc ofwhat is present" to it. The presence of what is~t is That to which the
staling and thinking remain directed. This means that staling and thinking are claimed by
the presence ofwhat is present. It is only by the conjunction of stating and thinking, and
their subsequent focus on the presence of what is present, that the nature of thinking
required by the presence of what is present will be adequale. Furthcnnore,lhe presence
of what is present in a veiled manner names the "u" in "It is useful"I99, and thereby names
that which calls thinking into its essential nature, into the conjunction of stating and
thinki.Dg.:NIO
1"JliliL. Pgs. 236-237.
It is to be noted that the "it" in "it is useful" docs not arise out ofthe Greek but rather
from Heidcgger's translation. There is no "it" in the Greek.
""!llilI.Pg.239.
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Hcidcggcr rcpons that Panncnidcs often says thinking. taking-to-bcart. instead of
stating and thinking. and Being rather than the Being ofbcings. Following Panncnidcs'
substitution, Hcidcggcr claims that thinking qua thinking belongs together with Being
and thereby belongs to Being.lOl Hcidegger citcs another fragment ofParmcnides for
evidence of this. nus fragment is usually translated: "For it is lbc same thing to think
and to bc".202 By examining the words "the same", which do not mean "identical with",
Heideggcr discovers that we can speak of''the samc" in relation to thinking and Being
because Parmcnides tclls us that, without and apart from any relation 10 Being. thinking is
not thinking: "for not separately from the presence ofwhat is present can you find out thc
taking_to-hean.·>lO:! Thereby "the same" refers to what belongs together: "for the same:
taking to heart is so also presence ofwhat is present...llM nunking and Being belong
togetherbecausc the essential nature ofthinking coosists in its concentration on the
presence of what is present. Conversely, Being keeps and guards thinking within itself as
what belongs to it. From thc presence ofwhat is present thc call is madc that calls us into
thc essential natUre of thinking, "that admits thinking into its own nature and there keeps
and guards it.·>J1)5 The call calls thinking into its own nature by directing thinking into
lOlJlUd.Pg.24O.
202.1llliL.Pg.24O.
lO3JlUd.Pg.241.
:KMIhi5lPg.241.
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Being. Yet this does not answer questions of why and bow the Being ofbeings calls us
inlo thought. Heideggercan relay to us that !he presence ofwhat is present is not Being
by itselfor what is present laken alone, or both added together in synthesis: it is rather
that "their duality, emerging from their unity kept hidden, keeps thecall.'o206
From Heidegger's dis<:ussion ofthe leap of vision, "thinking" and Being as the
presence ofwhat is present, it is possible to make connections between seeing, thinking
and presence. To begin with, it has already been established that the duality ofBcing and
beings cannot be observed; we can only see beings, not Being. Furthermore, we cannot
see beings rise from unconceaJment, we can only see that beings are present. However,
through the leap of vision that Heidegger describes, it is possible to dis<:em that from
Being beings rise from unconceaJment and thereby Being is the presence of what is
present. That which calls us 10 think in the manner ofletting lie before us and taking 10
heart is calling us to sec in the mannerofa leap of vision. We are called upon 10 see what
is not merely present, Le., beings, but what makes beings present, Being. When we let
what lies before us lie before us as it is, we see it in its presence. Moreover, when we
take it to heart as it lies before us we are also seeing what is present in its presence.
From an explication of What Is Called Thinking? we can summarize that for
Heidegger thinking, in its origin, signifies the thane. The thane in tum signifies
thanking, devotion and memory. The thane is thought ofas the gathering of the constant
intention ofeverything the heart holds in present being. Memory is similar to this in that
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it is the gatheringofthougbt upon that which calls us to think., i.e., Being, and it is also a
staying with things. Devotion and the Ihanc are connected, since both are a staying with
things. Finally, thanking can be brought together with the Ihanc because it is defined as
the act of the heart giving thought to what it has and is and it is also an abiding with that
which it gives thought. These notions of gathering, of staying with that which is given
thought. and ofthe heart, are broughtloge1ber in Heidegger's explanation ofthinking as
the thanc. When Heidegger turns to the traditional conception of thinking he finds that it
originates from the logos. This identification of the logos with thinking results in the
connection of thinking with stating. Furthermore, Heidegger's examination of the logos
leads to an examination ofa fragment ofPannenides which Heidegger interprets to mean
that stating is a le11ing-lie-before-us and thinking is a taking-to-heart that which lies
before us. According to Heidegger's interpretation ofthe saying ofParmenides. that
which lies before us and is taken to hean is the duality ofBeing and beings. Thus
Heidegger concludes What Is Called Thinking? ;
... we have learned to see lhat the essential nature of thinking is
determined by what there is to be thought about: the presence of
what is present. the Being ofbeings. Thinking is thinking only when
it recalls in thought the eon, That which this word indicates properly
and bUly, that is, unspoken tacitly. And that is the duality ofbeings
and Being. This quality is what properly gives food for thought.
And what is so given, is the gift ofwhat is most worthy ofquestion.:!07
With this introduction of the gift of Being I now tum to chapter 3, which consists ofan
analysis of the notion of"the gift",and that of "thanking", as both these notions seem to
NI.niliL. Pg.244.
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point to theological aspects in Heidegger's philosophy.
7S
Clttlpter J "TIle Gift" ail ..Tluutki.lr,"
Section 3.0 Being, beings and language
In this chapter I will explore Heidegger's references 10 "the gift" and ''thanking''
in explaining the thinking of Being. In exploring these two notions I will focus on the
possibility that Heidegger's use ofthese words to describe man's relation to Being, and
thinking itself, call into queslion Heidegger's insistence that Being is not a being. In fael,
I would like to consider whether the use ofsuch tenns has theological connotations and
thereby makes Being into God. I have divided this chapter into three sections, the first of
which lays the groundwork for an examination ofHeidegger's theological sounding
language by examining what Heidegger says oflanguage in relation to Being and beings.
Once I have established what Heidegger says of how Being and beings are brought into
language I will move to considerations ofwbat Heidegger actually says of Being, in the
subsequent sections on ''the gift" and thinJcing as "thanking". The sections examining the
notion ofthe gift and that ofthanking will each move beyond mere examination of these
terms to a discussion ofwhethcr Heideggercharacterizes Being as the giver of the gift of
thinking, and ofwhether thinking as thanking is a thanking that is directed to Being. In
attending to these issues I will be considering whether through his language Heidegger
makes Being into a being, in particular God.
To begin this section, (section 3.0) [will continue where I left offwith the last
chapter, (chapter 2, section 2.3) in discussing the duality of Being and beings. I will take
up this discussion by emphasizing the relation between Being and language and how
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Being and beings are brought into language. To assist in the consideration of the relation
between Being and language, and how Being and beings are brought into language. I will
tum to Heidegger's essay "Letter on Humanism" since it takes up both considerations.
To this point I have focused on "What Is Called Thinkingf' and the essay "The Word of
Nietzsche: 'God is Dead" because the latter gives a background understanding of
Heidegger's view of metaphysics while the former presents Heidegger's concept of
thinking in relation to his view of metaphysics. The essay "Letter on Humanism"
provides Heidegger's view on how the bumanistic tradition. which Heidegger views as
encapsulated within metaphysics. understands man. To explain how man is
underestimated by humanism Heidegger describes the relation ~twcen man and Being.
in particular how this relation occurs through language and thinking. The "Letter on
Humanism" then brings together Heidegger's assertions on metaphysics and his concept
of"thinking", in relation to an understanding of man as he who thinks Being and brings
Being into language. This will provide a starting point which identifies how, according
10 Heidcgger, Being can be spoken of, and thereby enables further discl1SSion ofhow
Hcidcggcrdoes speak of Being.
As we have seen, Heidegger maintains that saying is really laying, in the sense of
letting-lie-before-us. What is crucial 10 this lctting·lie·before-us is that that which lies
before us has set itself up and is lying before us, not that we have set it up ourselves.
Laying is connected to saying in that saying something about something makes it lie
before us and appear. Thinking, as taking-to-heart, is not simply conjoined with saying,
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but the two an: in fact united. Taking to heart and mind is the gathering ofeverything
that lies before us. and through the gathering and saying of what lies before us that which
lies before becomes manifest.
But that which fust ofall lies before and is taken to heart is the difference
between Being and beings. Thus, what is spoken of initially is this difference. Although
the difference between Being and beinp is what first lies before us and is spoken of,
what actually lies before us as whal can be spoken of, is what. is present - beings. Being
brings forth beings, but in this bringing forth it conceals itself. Through saying we then
make beings appear and let them lie before us. However, it is in realizing that beings an:
beings through the lighting of Being, rather than being represented and set up as objects
that humans can dominate, that the truth ofBcing is brought to language, along with the
truth ofbeings. When we speak ofbeings we do so in a manner that lets beings appear
and become manifest through the lightingofBcing because we are the openncssor
lighting of Being in which beings become manifcst.2OI Therefore, in speaking of beings,
we speak of Being as this lighting, or prcsencing ofbcings. As Heidegger says,
In its essence, language is not the utterance ofan organism; nor is it
the expression ofa living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an
essentially correct way in lenos of its symbolic character, perhaps
not even in terms ofthe character of signification. Language is the
light.concealing advent of Being itself.lO!I
Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism".From~. Ed. David Farrell Krell.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978. Pg. 205.
"'IlWl.Pg.206.
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Heidegger is very specific about what we can say about Being and how we can
say it. In being very specific Heidegger is able to set up a distinction between his
thinking and mctaphysicalthinking, as the latter tries 10 "represent" Being as a being and
thereby speaks of and explains Being as though it is a being. Since Being is not a being,
il cannot be up/ained as a being in reference to other beings, and yet we can say the truth
of Being. This division between explaining and saying is pivotal to the distinction
between metaphysical thinking that represents, and the thinking that thinks Being and
brings Being to language through tbinlring. In explaining, we look upon thai which is to
be explained as an object before us. and the explanation that results is essentially
determined by us. Yet the speaking that Heideggerputs forward in contradistinction 10
this explaining is rather a letting somdhing arise and speak through us. As Heidegger
states, thinking "lets itselfbe claimed by Being so that it can say the truth ofBeing.'>l10
Language, for Heidegger, is as be says, "the house of Being". Nol only docs Being dwell
in this home, bUI man also takes up residcrx:e there to guard Being's home: 'Those who
think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their
guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the
manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their speech."m
But, rather than being claimed by Being so that Being can become manifest in
language and speak through man, humanity, within the rise ofsubject·ism, employs
!lOUiliLPg.I94.
!11IhkL.Pg.193.
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language for the manipulation, domination and objectification of beings. As previously
explained in chapler I subject-ism takes its rise with the move from the subject as
mbjectum or hypolceimenon, 10 the subject as the ego which determines everything
around it as an objecl represenled by it Through the employment oflanguage for these
purposes beings can be subjecllO explanations and proofs, which follows from their
being encountered as "actualities" in a "cak:ulative business-like way", but also
scientifically and philosophically.2ll Hcidegger then concludes that it is through such
explanations and proofs that we come to believe that we can approach Being as though "it
were already decided that the truth of Being lets itselfal all be established in causes and
explanatory grounds, or whal comes to be the same, in their incomprchensibility.',m
Thus, in order for Being 10 become manifest in language, thereby returning language 10
its essence as the house of Being, we must let ourselves be claimed by Being rather than
representing Being.ll• When we are claimed by Being and bring Being to manifestation
in language we recognize the difference between Being and beings and put this difference
in words by naming beings.
In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger tells us thai to name "is to call and clothe
something with a word".m What is called responds to, or is at the call of the word and
lI2.1liliL.Pg.I99.
m!llliL.Pg.I99.
l'·.Ihi4.Pg.I99.
llSHeidegger, What b Called Thinking? Pg. 120.
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when it is called it is called to appear as what is present. Thus, as Heidegger says: "By
naming. we call on what is present to arrive...l16 When we name beings and thus bring
them into language we are calling beings into presence and become aware ofbcings as
they are brought forth from Being. By bringing the truth ofbcings. as the unconcealed,
into language, the truth ofBcing as that which unconc:eals beings is also brought into
language. This naming can then be thought ofas a saying, wllich docs not attempt to
conceptualize or grasp beings., but rather lets them speak through man as they lie before
With this naming. then, the duality of Being and beings is revealed.
From lhis examination of language we sec that, for Heidcgger, language returns to
its essence, and Being becomes manifest in language when we listen to Being and let
language speak through us. When we listen to the call of Being and are claimed by Being
we are able 10 witness beings as they are brought forth from Being; thus as they are in
themselves. However, language is also relevant for Heidegger because Being itself puts
restraints on what can be said of it. In other words. the very nature of Being, if Being can
be spoken ofin such a manner, limits how it can be described and what can be said of it.
Being is not a being, and thereby it cannot be described as such. But Heidegger's
insistence that Being is not a being limits what Heidegger can say of Being. Just as the
"seeing" within Heideggcr's "leap of vision" is not easily put into words, as the essence
oflhis leap is the seeing. 50 too is Being not easily expressed in language.
Although Heidegger tells us that we must let language speak through us, lhis is
111!ililPg.120.
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incredibly difficult to do because our everyday experience of language emerges from our
understanding oftbinking. which in tum emerges from the logos: thinking is saying
something about something in the form ofa proposition. That which is asserted about
something is a predicate, and that ofwmch the predicate is asserted is the subject.
Language, as based on the subject-predicate form., can be seen as a manipulation of
language in its essential form, i.e., language as that which speaks through man rather than
being used as a tool for man. This manipulation oflanguage seems 10 manifest itself in
the very manner by which we use language - to say something about something by
predicating it. However, this manner of saying something about something differs from
Heidegger's explanation of"laying". laying, as a saying something about something,
calls a being into presence as that which has risen from unconcealment. Saying
something about something in the manner ofpredication seems to be altogether different,
as it overlooks the mere presence ofa being in favofofwhat can be said about it. In fact,
it can even be said that this predication that occurs in language reinforces the subject·ism
of metaphysics. This subject-ism presents itself in language through the emphasis on the
subject and predicate. In language we say something about a subject by predicating it,
we make it accessible to us in language by giving it predicates. The subject-ism of
language then resides in the fact that by giving a being predicates we determine it
ounelves and an: able to grasp il in the manner it has been determined. We, in a sense,
place a botmdary around the being by thinking of it merely in relation 10 those predicates
that we apply to it. A being or subject is then limited to those predicates which are
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determined and applied to it by man. Man essentially "captures" a being in language, and
this capture can in fact be seen as another manner of humanity's objectification and
domination ofthe eanb. Rather than the naming which calls a being into presence, and
allows it to appear as it is in iuelf, by applying certain predicates to a being we are
designating or labeling it as a particular thing in the manner by which it may be useful to
see it. However, Being is not some thing which we can predicate. Being cannot be
encountered as a being, thus the limiting aspect oflanguage is not applicable 10 Being.
Instead, the limit is in tenns ofwhat we can say ofBeing. In this sense the "seeing"of
Being would take priority over any possible expression of Being in language. Yet, if
Heidegger is 10 tell his readers about Being, he must: have recourse to language. The
duality ofBeing and beings then further manifests itself in the fact that beings can easily
be put in language, in the sense ofbeing named and being labelled, while Being cannot
Section 3.1 The analysis of "the Gift"
The difference between Being and beings is further emphasized in language by
the use of the word "is". In "Letter on Hwnanism" Heidegger mentions that in.lki..n&..JDd
IiIM the statement ..... only as long as Dasein is (that is, as long as an understanding of
Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being"m refers to the problem of using the word
"is" in relation to Being. In German "there is" tnmslates as "es gibt", which is an
impersonal phrase, and in English "es gibt" literally means "it gives". Heidegger tells us
mHeidegger,~. Pg.212.
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that "it gives" is used instead oC"is" in order to avoid saying that "Being is". Heidegger
Cears that saying 4s" in relation to Being may pennit Being to be thought oC as a being,
since "is" can rightly be said oC a being. However, Heideggcr points out that "in the early
age oCthinking" Parmenides tells w that "esti gar einar', which translates: "Cor there is
Being".llI From Pannendes' statement Heideggcr suggests the possibility that "is" can
only appropriately be said of Being, not individual beings. Thus what properly "is" is
Being rather1han individual beings.1lt ReCerence 10 Being as what properly "is" or
"already is" occurs in "Letter on Humanism" in Heidegger's discussion oCthe
accomplishment oCthe relation oCBeing 10 the essence oCman through thinking.
Heideggcr stales that this accomplishment can only occur because Being "already is" and
only that which already is can be accomplished.110 As Heidegger slates:" . what 'is'
above all is Being".211
"It gives" is used instead oC"1here is" to highlight the ontological difference
between Being and beings; however, the "it gives" also speaks oCthe manner in which
Being presents itself, iCSeing can be said 10 present itselfat all. According to Heideggcr
llIHeidegger, "LetteroD Humanism". Pg. 214.
1ltIlilil.Pg.214.
"'Thi.<l Pg.I03.
UlIllliLPg.193.
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in the phrase "it gives" the "it" that "gives" is Being.m Moreover, he tells us that the
essence of Being is giving.llJ This giving occurs through Being giving its truth and itself.
Thus Heideggerrefers 10 Being as the "self-giving inlo the open".ll4 Therefore, it can be
said that Being gives itself; OOwever, "it is" does not give itself as ilSclf, it rather gives
the duality of itself and beings by bringing forth from itselfbeings as beings.
No! only does Being give itselfand its truth, but in What Is Called Thinking? we
are told that Being gives thinking to man. In his initial discussion of1he four ways of
asking the question "what is called thinking?" Heidegger mentions that the fourth
fonnulation of the question, which is "'what is it that calls on us to think?", is more than
just another fonnulation ofthe initial question. As I have previously pointed out. this
fonnulation of the question also asks: "What makes a call upon us that we should think
and, by thinking, be woo we are?,>ID At this point in the text Heidegger refers to Being
as what is "mostlhought-provolcing" and tells us that that which is most thought-
provoking gives us itself, as a gift, to think about. Furthennore, that which calls us to
think does not merely give us itself to think about. but it "first gives thought and thinking
In his essay "Theology in 'Zeit und Sein'" Peter Harris points out that in Heidegger's
essay "Time and Being" the"U" thaI gives is "Ereignis", or Event of Appropriation.
Ereignis in fact gives Being. Harris, Peter. "Theology in 'Zeit und Sein'" Unpublished.
2001. Pgs. 3 and 12.
WlliliLPg.214.
114.DWL Pg. t 93.
wHeidegger, What Is Called Thinkjng? Pg. 121.
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10 us, it entrusts thought to us as our essential destiny and thus first joins and appropriates
us 10 tboughl.>tl2t Being then gives itsclflo us as a gift and gives us the gift of thinking.
Heidegger also speaks ofBeing giving thought 10 man in "Letter on Humanism".
In this essay Heidegger states: '1binking accomplishes the relation of Being to the
essence ofman. It does nol make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to
Being solely as something handed over to it from Being."m As that which gives
thinking, Being is described as the "enabling" which enables thinking by embracing it
and bringing il inlo its essence. Thinking is said 10 be "of' Being 10 the extent that
ihinking belongs 10 Being, and thus can be given by Being. In belonging to Being,
thinking listens 10 Being and it is by this listening that thinking is what it is in its essential
narure.m In facl, Heidegger claims that 10 say that thinking is, is to say that "Being has
fatefully emlxaced its essence.'tm Heidegger seems to be saying that thinking truly "is"
when Being has brought about the accomplishment of thinking as that which "is".
Being brings about this accomplishment by embracing thinking. We are told that
to embrace a ''thing'' or "person"in its essence is 10 love and favor it. Heidegger focuses
on the idea offavoring and reveaJs that in an original way to favor is to bestow essence as
a gift. Furthermore, this favoring is the proper essence ofenabling ''which not only can
226.1hist.Pg.121.
U7Heidegger, "Letter on Humarrism". Pg. 193.
llIJllliL.Pg.I96.
"'I!lid.Pg.I96.
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achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is,
let it be:,JJo Being is then the enabling, and this enabling has its essence in favoring,
which in itself is a bestowing ofessence as a gift. It seems then that we can conclude that
giving is an essential aspect of Being.
I wollid suggest that there are two reasons for speaking ofgiving as characterizing
Being's relation to man and of giving as the essence ofBeing. 1be first is that since
Being is not a being which can be represenled, Heidegger must insist that Being is nol to
be characterized as a being which "is", and in accordance with this that the thinking that
thinks Being not be representational. It seems that the best way to avoid this is to claim
that our thinking of Being is given to us by Being. In this way we cannot dcvisc our own
conceptions ofBcing, because our thinking of Being has been given to us by Being itself
For example, within Nietzsche's metaphysic, according to Heidegger's account, Being is
seen as the will to power, yet this is merely an interpretation of Being sent from itself
The history of Being is Being itselfpresenting itselfthrough beings, yet not presenting
itself as itself However, when we think Being in the manner Heidegger puts forward,
thinking is not a thinking o/some thing, bUl this thinking is a lening oUfKlves be called
and claimed by Being. This notion of Being giving itself to us to be thought about,
giving thinking to us as our essence, and ofgiving itself in giving beings, is crucial in
order to emphasize that thinking is not a sening up before ourselves what is to be thought
about, but rather a waiting to be called and claimed by Being, thereby placing ourselves
~P.. I96.
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in submission or relcasement to Being.
These notions of waiting and releasemenl to Being are found in Heidegger's
dialogue "A Conversation on a Country Path", itself found in his texi~
IhiDIW!&. The dialogue is between a scbolar, a teacher and a scientist and is focused on
a discussion oflhe nature of thinking. The teacher is a moulhpiece for Heidegger's
views and Ihereby introduces Hcidegger's 'ihinking" to Ihe other two. The scientist's
contribulions to the conversation indicate that he is a proponent ofrepresentational
Ihinking; yet over Ihe course of the conversation he is swayed toward Heidegger's
thinking. The scholar seems to be a mediator between the two working to flush out the
views Ihat belh are presenting.
The concept of thinking that Heideggerpresents in "A Conversation on a Country
Palh", which is opposed to representational thinking, is that thinking consists in being
open 10 Ihe manner by which beings arise from Being, and to Being itself. By thinking in
Ihis manner, which Heidegger refers to as ''releasement'', man is open to Being and Ihus
is an openness; but at the same time Being is open to man as lAc region, or expanse, from
which beings emerge. In German "region" translat.es as gegnet, which means
"expanse".lll Thus in this text Heidegger refers to Being as "that-which-regions" thereby
emphasizing Ihat Being is an openness which presents beings 10 man, and that this
manner of being open is an aetivitythat Being cames out.lll Although releasement is a
1llHeidegger, Piscourse on Thjn!cing. Pg. 66.
lllDili1..Pg.27.
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manner ofthinking which man is capable of, we are told in the dialogue that releasement
is to be "let in" from somewhere beyond ourselvesY' Although releasement is presented
as some kind of goal, we are told that representational thinking is the only thinking
possible to mankind at present, and because representational thinking will nol instigate
releasement we must simply wait for releasement. Heidegger explains that wailing is
contrary to awaiting because awaiting is a waiting for something which we represent to
ourselves, while waiting does not have an object. When we wait we leave open what we
are waiting for because "waiting releases itself into openness, inlo the expanse of
distance, in whose nearness it finds the abiding in which it remains".~
Further into the conversation il is discovered that releasemenl is a movement that
rests in Being, or that-which-regions. and Being enables releasement. According to
Heidegger, waiting releases us from representational thinking and in releasement we
reach Being. Waiting is releasing oneself inlo the openness ofthat-which-regions and is
a going into lhat-which-regions. Not only does waiting release one into thal-which-
regions., but waiting is also held by tbat-which-regions when il enlers into it. llS To the
extent that waiting is held by that-which-regions it can be said thaI releasement is let in
by that-which-regions. According 10 Heidegger releasement must be based upon that-
which-regions and the movement releasement has toward that-which-regions must have
DJ.Illi.!lPg.61.
UfIliliL.Pg.68.
lls.lhi.JL.Pg.72.
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come from that.which-regions. That releasement must be based upon lhat-which.regions
is in accordance with the fact that its relation to that-which-regions is determined by that-
which_regions.lJ6 Heidegger tells us that relcascment emerges from that-which-regioDS,
because in releasement we remain released to that-which-regions and in fact this
releascment is sustained through thaI-which-regions. Furthennore, we are released to
that-which-regions in our being, because we originally belong to that-which-regions.
This belonging occurs because we are appropriated to that-which-regions through that-
which-regions.D1 Thus Heidegger states:
Releasement comes out of that-which-regions because in releasement man
stays released to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself. He is
released to it in his being, insofar as he originally belongs to it. He belongs
to it insofar as he is appropriated initially 10 that-which-regions and, indeed,
throughthisitself.DlI
It is then concluded that the nature ofwaiting is releasement to that-which-regions, and
since !hat-which-regions lets releascment belong to it then the nature of thinking resides
in ''the regioning of reieasement by that-w!tich-regions".219
From this examination of Discourse on Thinking we see that thinking is a waiting
to be called by Being, and that when we are called by Being we are released to Being.
This manner of reieasement is not simply a belonging to Being, but seems to be similar to
"'IlWI.Pg. 73.
D'IhUlPg.73.
lJIThi..!t..Pg.73.
"'IlWI.Pg.74.
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what Heidegger has said of devotion. In discussing what "thinking" signifies Heidcgger
explains that the tbaoc refers to the memory, and that memory means the same thing as
devotion. Devotion is defined as a constant concentrated abiding with something, and it
is the heart that carries out this concentrated abiding.1010 Similar to devotion, releasement
is a staying with that-which-regions because it belongs to it in the same manner that the
heart stays with Being.l~l Although Heidegger does not explicitly state it, there appears
to be a sense of submission or ofgiving oneself to Being in the notion of releasement
We submit and give ourselves over to that-which·regions because we realize that we
originally belong to and arc appropriated by it.
I have now presented what I suggest to be the first reason Heidegger speaks of
giving as characterizing Being's relation to man and ofgiving as the essence of Being.
To recapitulate: the first reason is that the best way to avoid any representational thinking
which makes Being into a being which "is", isto insist that our thinking of Being is
given to us by Being. The second reason, which follows from the first, is that Heidegger
must refer to the notion of the gift because Being itself leaves this as the only way for us
to speak about it. We cannot see Being, it conceals itselfand withdraws from us; thus the
only way we can say anything of the troth of Being is if Being gives itself to us, enabling
man to think and speak of it. Therefore, we wait for Being to give itself. and as we have
l«;{eidegger. What kCaIJeciThjnkjng?Pgs. 140-141.
I will return to the concept ofdevotion to discuss it in relation to worship. However, it is
presently worthwhile to poinl out the similarity between devotion and releasement.
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seen. if we do not wait for this giving but instead go about conceiving of Being on the
basis of beings, we are unable to reach Being. Being sends us interpretations ofitself
based on beings, but these interpretations arise from not waiting for Being 10 give itself as
itself. As arcsult of this unwillingness to wait, man turns to beings in ordcrto find
Being. It appears then that Being determines itself as sclf·giving. Thus it is fitting to
speak of''thc gift" of thinking from Being, and the gift ofBeing as that which is to be
Ihought about, because any contact wc have with Being seems 10 arise only if Being gives
itself to us.
However, despite the fact that speaking of"the gift" is necessary for Heidegger's
distinction between representational thinking and the thinking that thinks Being, and
because ofms claim that thinking of Being is only possiblc if Being gives itself to be
thought about, this notion of the gift is reminiscent ofthe Christian notion of"gracc". In
his book~ Philosophy ofBeing Herman Philipse suggests that although
Hcidegger insists that Bcing is not the Christian God, Heidcgger's thought is not that
removed from the Christian tradition. In fact, Philipsc refen; to Heideggcr's thought as
"postmonotheist". Philipse explains that Heidegger's thought can be termed
postmonotheist because for Hcideggcr monotheism is over, the God that has been
misinterpreted as Being is dead, as Nietzsche has pronounccd.2<4l Howcver, Heideggcr's
For Nietzsche "God" represents the suprasensory world "as the world that truly is and
dctennines all, ideals and Ideas, the purposes and grounds that dctennine and support
everything that is and human life in particular". (Heideggcr, '1'he Word ofNictzsche:
'God is Dead''', Pg. 66) The suprascnsory realm can also be considered as man's highest
value. When Nietzsche pronounces the death ofGod he is referring to his belief that man
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thought remains monotheist to the extent that structural parallels can be found between
traditional Christian theology and Hcidegger's later discourse on Being. These two
aspects ofpostmoootbcism arc complementary and thus the postmonothcist theme is
defined as: '"the attempt to replace the Christian religion by a different variety of religious
discourse, the meaning ofwhich is parasitic upon the monotheist Christian discourse that
it intends to destroy".W
According to Philipse. Heidegger's intention to destroy Christian discourse stems
from the ract that in Heidegger's view the Christian tradition misconceived Being as a
being by taking Being to be God, whom they saw as the highest being. Hcidegger's
problem with the Christian God lies in the notion orcreation - that God is a creator and
all other beings God's creation.24'1 With this notion orcreation "to be" becomes
synonymous with ''being produced" and production be<:omes a ccntral1heme within
metaphysics, culminating in the interpretation or beings as in some manner being
produced by humans. In Being and Time Heidegger says that createdness "in the widest
senseorsomething's having been produced, was an essential item in the suucture orthe
has realized that the ideals and goals presented by the suprasensory realm cannot be
actualized wilhin the sensory realm. Thus the suprasensory realm. or the highcst values,
devalue themselves. In response 10 this man brings about a revaluation of values which
recognizes the will 10 power as the principle of the new value-positing. (Heidegger. "The
Word orNietzsche: 'God is Dead·... Pgs. 66 and 15)
24JPhilipsc. Pg. 181.
2.....IlW!" Pgs. 184-85.
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ancient conception ofBeing".~ Philipse points OUI that Heidegger adovocalcs a
rejection oflhe ancient conception ofGod as a creator because this notion "dispels our
sense ofwonder about the fact that beings are:>2-46 Ratherlhan simply accepting that
beings have been created by God Heidegger think.s that we should look to Being "as the
wonderful process ofrevealing entities to US".141 However, despite Heidegger's intention
to destroy Christian discourse and reinstate Being as the process of unconcealment.
Heidegger's discourse can be seen as parasitic upon the Christian discourse. This
Christian discourse upon which Heidegger's thought is parasitic is primarily infonned by
Luther, in fact Philipse asserts that the apparent religious aspects ofHeidegger's later
works can be thought ofas "a radicalization ofLuther".m Furthennore, Philipse claims
that it is possible to undentand Being's self-giving essence in relation to the Christian
conception ofgrace when Heidegger's thought is considered to be a radicalization of
Luther.
Philipse explains that Luther's break with Roman Catholicism was brought about
in reaction to "extravagant" practices within Catholicism, such as selling irxlulgences.
l1te practice of selling indulgences gave testimony to the fact that human actions were
being traded for inner repentance, and this lead Luther to question the justification ofman
mHeidegger.~. Pg. 25.
246philipse. Pg. 191.
l~7llWLPg. 191.
l ..nmt. Pg. 182.
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before God. Luther came to the conclusion that, contrary to the Church's belief that good
works and sacraments aid in the justification of man, ''God's rigl11eousness cannot be
conceived in terms ofa transaction in which satisfaction is made to God.'~~ Luther
found the basis ofthis belief in St. Paul, who claimed that man is made righteous before
God and transfonncd only by God's grace. Consequently. human actions are severed
from the ultimate determination ofman's destiny. "GTace alone dccidcs".1SO Therefore.
SI. Paul and Luther hold that grace is not an obligation God has toward us in response to
our adherence to the laws ofreligion and the sacraments, or our good deeds. Rather.
grace is a free gift of God and God is the one who determines the dispensation of it.
Hcidegger speaks in a similar manner of the gift ofReing. maintaining that we
may prepare ollfSClvcs for Being's coming, but in the end it is decided by Being alone
whether it will continue to withhold itselfor give itselfto us.lSI In his essay 'The Word
ofNietzsche: 'God is Dead'" Hcidegger speaks of thinking as being preparatory. and
explains the nature ofthis preparation as follows: "What manen to preparatory thinking
is to light up that space within which Being itself might again be able to take man, with
respect to his essence. into a primal relationship. To be preparatory is the essence of such
thinking.'>l'l Although we may prepare ourselves to receive Being's grace. it is apparent
l'".nili1.Pg.lS2.
~Pg.182.
lJI!lllit.Pg.I96.
1j1Heidegger, "The Word ofNiemche: 'God is Dead..•. PS. 55.
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that Being alone will decide when it gives itself. This can be aUesied to when Heidegger
speaks ofBeing[avoring man. Being's inclination toward man. and, as we have seen
from DiscoWK on Thinking that the releasement ofman to Being is "let in" by Being.
In fact, the very notion of a gift seems to imply that it is the giver who decides whether
the gift will be given, since otherwise we cannot speak of that which is given as a gift.
Although Philipse refers to Heidegger's thought as postmonotheist, a distinction
must be made between the God oftraditional philosophy, which is a misinterpretation of
Being, and the God offaith. Heideggerbimselfmakes this distinction in his book
Identjty and Difference wherein he explains the essential constitution ofmetaphysics as
onto-theology. In Identity and Difference Heidegger explains that metaphysics is onlO·
theology because it is concerned with beings as beings (thus it is ontology) and it is
concerned with finding the reason or ground ofthe IOtality or whole of beings (thereby
being theologic).m Metaphysics interprets the Being ofbeings as this ground of beings
taken as a whole:
Metaphysics thinks ofbeings as such, that is, in general. Metaphysics
thinks ofbeings as such, as a whole. Metaphysics thinks of the Being
of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what
is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that
accounts for the ground, that is, ofthe All-Highest. The Being ofbeings
is thus thought ofin advance as the grounding ground.1St
However, the Being of beings comes to be thought ofas God when theftrsl ground is
IDHeidegger, Identity and pifference. Pg. 54.
!SlnmL. Pg. 58.
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sought ou1. Thus the Being ofbeings is "represented fundamentally, in the sense oftbe
ground" only when it is represented as causa sui.:lSS Heidegger points out that causa sui
is the metaphysical concept ofGod.1S6 Furthermore, Heideggcr distinguishes between the
metaphysical concept ofGod and the god offaith or the divine God. In reference to the
metaphysical God Heidegger states: "Man can neither pray nor sacrifice 10 this god.
Before the causa sui, man can neither fall 10 his knees in awe nor can he play music and
dance before this goo:'251 However, the thought ofGod that is not based on an
understanding ofhim as causa sui, is, as Heidegger slates, "perhaps closer 10 the divine
God" and "more open to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit".2SI
From this we see that for Heidegger-there is a difference between the
metaphysical conception ofGod, and the God of faith. When Heidegger refen to the
misinterpretation ofBcing as a being, namely God. he is referring to the metaphysical
God. However, when Heidegger speaks of the possibility ofthe God of faith it is nol
necessarily thought of as a being in relation to Being, but as something that can only be
understood once the truth of Being is undentood. Thus it seems that a possible God of
faith does not stand above Being. In "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger stales: "Only
from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of
1SS.I:IiliL. Pg. 69.
2S6Jbid. Pg. 60.
:lS7.DiliLPg.72.
:lS1JlWt.Pg.72.
97
the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought Only in the light of the essence of
divinity can it be thought or said what the word 'God' is to signify.'>l:I· The analogy
Philipsc draws between Heidegger's Being and God seems to be an analogy between the
Christian God of theology, the causa sui and highest. being, and Being. Although
Heideggersees the Christian God oftheology as a being, it will be revealed that there are
structural parallels between the God of theology, particularly the theology of Luther. and
Being. Furthermore, I bope to show that faith seems to playa large enough role in the
thinking of Being 10 draw similarities between religious faith and the thinking of Being.
Heidegger maintains that Being is not a being and carmol be represented, yet he
uses language that places Being in proximity to a God that he insists is thought of as a
being. If Being can be thought ofnot merely analogously with this God. but can in fact
be identified with it, the only reason Being would then be interpreted as a being is
because Heidegger insists that in the Western tradition God is represented as a being. But
this is simply Heidegger's own interpretation of God and it seems quite possible that
proofcould be found 10 discredit this intetpretation.
In fact, John Macquarrie, in his book Heidegger and Christianity argues thai
Heidegger overlooks the varieties of theologies, in particular the theologies of Paul
Tillich, Dionysius the Arcopagite and St Thomas, who all speak ofGod in terms of
;z,tueideggcr, ..Letter on Humanism". Pg. 230.
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Being rather than as a being.~ Macquarrie explains that Tillich "cventually came to see
God's relation to the creatures in much the same terms as Heideggervisualizcd the
relation of Being to beings.'0261 For Tillich "God is not a being, not even the supreme
being, but Being itself.,>l6l Moreover, according to Macquarrie, Tillich was not the first
to claim that God is Being; in fact, theologians had been spealcing ofGod as Being from
the time ofDionysius the Areopagite, who referred to God as "1Jyperousia", "beyond
being", Likewise St. Thomas, who used the term ens, 'a being', for God, qualified this
term in order to distinguish the ens ofGod from "all innerworldly eolia" as a unique
reality that may be thought ofas "wholly other" to finite entities.263 Therefore, if
Heidegger's theistic language can be said to move beyond analogy with God to
identification, then the only reason Being would be thought ofas a being, is because
Heidegger himself holds to an interpretation ofGod which sees God as a being. This
interpretation ofGod as a being seems 10 be necessary for his discourse on Being, for
otherwise God would either be ontologically equal or superior 10 Being, and Heidegger
would have to speak about God and Being in the same marmer. or revert to speaking
solely about God. Although Heidegger does draw a distinction between the God of faith
Macquarrie, John. Heidegm and Cbri$lianity. New York: The Continuum Publishing
Company. 1994. Pg. 55.
261ThiJl..Pg.55.
26llllliL.Pg.55.
UJI!lliL.Pg.55.
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and traditional conceptions of God, he seems to focus primarily on insisting that the
traditional conceptions of God make God into a being, thereby differentiating Being from
God. However, it is in the rcaIm offaith that similarities between the thinking of Being
and religious faith can arise. In Hcidegger's identification ofthinking with thanking
these similarities present themselvC5.
Seetion 3.2 Thinking as thanking
In this section I will build upon thcconclusions reached in chapter 1, where I
discussed the origin of''thinking'' in the tirane, as these conclusions are useful in a further
consideration of''thc gift". In this explanation ofwhat 'iJtinki.ng" signifies. Heidcgger
reveals that "thinking" has its origin in the word thane, and that lhe thane is itself
connected to memory and "thanks". Just as memory is a gathering, keeping, and staying
wilh things so, too, is lhe thane. as it is the gathering of the constant intention of
everything that the heart holds in present being. Likewise,. "thanks" and the thane are
brought together, to the extent that giving thanks is an act ofthe heart giving thought to
what it is staying with and what it is. Inasmuch as thanks and memory are a concentrated
abiding with things, memory and thanks can be equated with devotion. Therefore. since
the thone is connected to memory and thanks, the thane can also be thought ofas similar
to devotion. Giving thanks is giving thought, and thanks are given for the gift ofour
essence, given to us by Being. Thus we give thanks forthc gift of thinking by giving
thought to Being. In my discussion of "the gift" I have presented the possibility that the
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notionof"'the gift" functions to binder a representation ofBeing as a being to be
dominated and manipulated by man, by placing Being above man as the giver of his
essenlial nature. Being gives man the gift ofthinlcing, his essential nature, but man must
simply wail to receive this gift. When thinking is characterized as thanking, memory and
devotion, the representation ofBcing appears to be hindered. lfgiving thanks is giving
thought and thought is regarded in its origin as the thane, the gathering of the constant
intention ofeverything the heart holds in present being, then thanking is also this
gathering ofconstant intention. This identification of thanking as thinking reveals the
nature ofthanking to beconlral)' to representational thinking. What the heart holds in
present being is what lies before. and it holds whal lies before as it lies before and has set
itself up before us. [n representational thinking what lies before us is what is sct up by
man. Therefore, thinking as thanking, in the manner Heidcgger describes, cannot occur
within representational thinking.
The identification of thinking with thanking also reveals that the relation between
Being and man is not one of subject and object. Man is thankful to Being and this seems
to place him in a position of supplication to Being. Giving thanks, which is giving
thought, allows forman's realization that be is not the determining eenterofthe world
who comes to decide what Being is, but rather there is something higber than man, which
man comes to stand hwnblybeneath in order to receive the gift of his essence. In
receiving this gift man maintains his hwnble stance and gives thanks to Being by giving
thought to Being. Giving thought to Being is also a keeping Being in memory and
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constantly staying with Being.
Giving thought can then be consideml to be devotion, and as Macquarrie
suggests, it can even be considered as worship. Macquarrie suggests that from
Heideggcr's discussion ofthe heart giving thanks and giving itselfin thought to that
which holds it, that to which it "thinks of itselfas beholden,. not in the sense of mere
submission, but beholden bc<:ausc its devotion is held in listening", thinking can be seen
as worship.26oI Macquarrie interprets thinking as follows:
A true thinking is more than an intellectual operation, it is a disposition
infused with thankfulness. This disposition is addressed to that which is
above all thought.worthy and tbought.evoking. To quole: "How can we
give thanks for this gift, the gift ofbcing able to think what is most
thought-cvoking, more fittingly than by giving thoughl to the most
thought-evoking?" Thinking therefore is for Hcidegger close to worship,
and the expression 'piety ofthinking' is not misplaced when applied to
him.w
Whereas Macquarrie speaks of thinking as worship, Philipse speaks of thinking as
devotion. Philipse explains that for Heidegger, Denken, the German for "thinking", is
substituted by Andenken, the German noun for ·"remembering", which Hcidegger uses as
a verb. According 10 Philipse, Andenken is related 10 the German word Andacht, which
means dl!llOtion.l66 Thinking can be seen as devotion when we consider thinking to be a
constant questioning, as Philipse does. However, this devoted thinking differs from
Macquarrie, Pg. g2. Macquarrie quoting from Hcidcggcr, What Is Called Thinking? Pg.
141.
U;'IllliLPg.82.
l66philipsc. Pg. 197.
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rcfigious devotion. which rests on faith. simply because Hcidegger distinguishes the
thinking ofBeing from religious faith. Faith does not question, "faith is seen as the
preswnption ofknowiDg the answer to all questions concerning the meaning oflife.'>261
Not only is thinking not 10 be equated with faith. but it is also removed from logic, to the
extent that what thinking yields can never be proven or broughllogether in a logical
argwnent. l6I Although Hcidc:ggcr distinguishes thinking from faith, his notion ofthe
"leap of vision" appears to require faith. As Heidegger has slaled in~
Thinking a leap is required for thinking 10 drink Being. In speaking of translating the
words "being" and "to be" into Greek Heidegger Slates:
Such translation is possible only if we transpose ourselves inlO what
speaks from these words. And this transposition can succeed only by
a leap, the leap ofa single vision which sees what the words "being"
and "10 be", heard with Greek ears, state ortell.269
Philipse singles out this notion ofthe leap, pointing out that it recalls what St. Paul and
Kierlcegaard have said offolly and faith respectively. SI. Paul says that by God's doing
the wisdom of the world became folly, thus faith came to appear foolish or mad when
viewed from a common sense perspective. Similarly, Kierkegaard maintains that faith
will only come to us by a leap, because there i:i an abyss between finile human beings and
the Infinite, i.e., God.
Heidegger appears 10 be saying something similar in relation to thinking, when he
M1philipse. Pg. 197.
l6l11W1 Pg. 198.
l6'i-leidegger, Wbat Is Called Thinking? Pg. 232.
103
states that thinking may appear foolish when viewed from a common sense penpectivc.
and that a leap is necessary for thinking ofBeiDg. lbinking can, then, be connected to
religious devotion to the cxtent that it appears as foolish and that it also requires a leap.
What Kierkegaard and St. Paul regard as faith is analogous to Heidegger's thinking, in
that Hcidcgger's thinking is not the representational, scientific or common sense thinking
that constitutes the traditional conception ofthinking. Thinking stands outside all of
these., thereby opening itself up to accusations of"imuionality". This distance between
the thinking ofBeing and the representational thinking ofmetaphysics lends itself to the
discussion ofa "leap" because "we can never prove what thinking yields, nor argue for
it".no I would suggest that there are further similarities between religious faith and
Heidegger's thinking.
In order to examine lhcse similarities I will tum to Hcidegger's essay
"Phenomenology and Theology", where Heidegger sketches out the difference between
philosophy and theology, and carries out a phenomenological reduction of theology. I
will focus here primarily on Heidegger's comments on faith, in order to reveal similarities
between Heidegger's thinking and faith. Fin! of all, Heidegger tells us that the essence
offaith can be thought ofas a mode ofhuman existence which "according to its own
testimony - itselfbelonging to this mode ofexistence - arises not from Dasein or
spontaneously through Dasein, but rather from that which is revealed in and with. this
l7!IphiJipse.Pg.198.
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mode ofexistence., from what is bclievcd.,olll Thus we see that lhc essence of faith is
dcpcDdent upon revelation since it in fact arises from that which is revealed in faith.
Moreover, faith cannot be entered into unless one believes that which is revealed; thus
faith testifies for itself According to Hcidcgger, Christ, the crucified God, is revealed to
faith and gives rise to faith. Similarly, the crucifixion, although it is an historical event, is
"known" only by belief. Heidegger explains that that which is revealed in faith is
imparted to actually existing individuals or communities of individuals.In This imparting
of revelation is not an imparting ofinfonnarion of past, present or future happenings, but
rather ''this imparting lets one partake of the event, which is revelation (= what is
revealed) itself.,ol7) Heidegger adds that the ''part-taking'' of faith is given only through
faith. The event ofcrucifixion is that which one partakes in and by partaking in this event
one's entire human existence, as a Christian existence, is placed before God. Once this
revelation occurs and one has been brought before God, one becomes aware ofone's
forgetfulness ofGod. Heidcgger concludes from this that "being placed before God
means that: existence is reoriented in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith.'0274
From this we sec that faith understands itself only in believing. Furtbennore, it is not by
Hcidegger. Martin. "Phenomenology and Theology" from The Piety of Thinking. Trans.
and Commentary James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press. 1976. Pg. 9.
lnllilil.Pg.9.
mniliL.Pg.lO.
174IliliL.Pg.lO.
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theoretical confirmation of his inner experiences thatlhc believer comes 10 know about
his existence in faith. Rather, it is only bybeliefthal he comes to know oflhis existence.
Hcidegger also tells us that the occurrence ofrcvelation, which is passed to faith
and occurs through faithfulness itself, "discloses itselfonly to faith".l1J Hcidegger quotes
Luther, stating that "Faith is penn.ining ourselves 10 be seized by the things we do not
seem", but he adds 10 this thai faith is more than the revelation of something actually
occurring, it is nol "some more or Ice=; modified type of knowing".m According to
Heidcgger faith is an "appropriation ofrcvelation".l1I Ilhinklhat in lhis context
"appropriation" may in fact be interpreted in tenns of Heideggcr's explanation of
"thinking": as a laking something up and staying wilh it, a laking to heart perhaps.
Hcidcggcr phenomenologically reduces faith to the "believing-understanding mode of
exisling in the historyoflhc revealed, i.e., occwring. with the Crucified", yet it seems
that from his explanation ofpart·laking that faith can be compared to lhinking in the
manneroftalcing-to-hcart.V9
Heideggcr also explains iliat theology is the science ofwhat is disclosed through
faith, whicb is that which is believed; but that which is believed is not a coherenl order of
mThtlL.Pg.lO.
"'nUs1.. Pg. 10 From Erlangcn Ausgabc WW, Vol. 46, p. 287.
mDilib.Pg.IO.
m.lh.id.,Pg.I0.
V91llliL. Pg. 10.
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propositions aboul facts or occurrences to which we can give assent.UO 11ut1 which is
believed is revelation. and revelation only occurs through faith. Moreover, theology as a
conceptual interpretation of faith, cannol make faith legitimate by founding it and
securing it, neither can it make it easier 10 acccp1 faith and remain faithful. In fact,
theology can only reveallhat faithfulness cannot be gained through the science of
theology, but can only be gained through faith.211
The motive for this consideration of Heidcgger's insights on theology is to reveal
that faith, as be presents it, seems comparable to Heidegger's leap of vision, which is
required for thinking. Faith is that which is revealed, it is given. The truth ofa revelalion
is accepted on the basis ofbclief, not from facts or argwnents. In much the same way
Heideggcr's leap of vision consists ofa belief-in, rather than a belief-that. According 10
the endnotes of the commentalors, James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo,lO
"Phenomenology and Theology", the positive sciences begin with beliefs-thai ''which
comprise the guiding paradigms, procedures, laws., ClC. taken for granted by the science,
and which open up the realm to be investigated."m However, the positive science of
theology, in illuminating the object of faith, is based on a belief-in. Heidegger's
''thinking'', as it is a thinking ofBeing which does not take Being as its object, seems
comparable to a belief-in, rather than to a belief-that, since be contrasts his thinking with
""nWLPg. II.
1I1DWl Pg. 12.
mThi.!L.Footnote4,Pgs.170-171.
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logical scientific thought. Furthennore, although he docs not speak of thinking ofBcing
as occurring by wayofa revelation, the notion ofthc gift of thinking from Being may be
a substitution for revelation.
The discussion of the "leap of vision" also appears to be comparable with faith, to
the extent that this leap ofviswn cannot be proven logically orconveycd to others, rather
it must simply be experienced. Just as the imparting of revelation given in faith is not an
imparting of information but instead lets one partake of that which is revealed in faith, so
too can the leap of vision be spoken ofas a partaking in the event of the revelation of
Being. In his book Hcjdeggq's Wan Hans-Gcorg Gadamcr explains that for Heidegger
God can only be "known" rather than proven within metaphysics. Similarly, the thinking
of Being corresponds with a "knowing" that docs not attempt to subject Being to
scientific or logical proofs, thereby trying to grasp or control Being as its object. Thus
Gadamcrstates;
But the one searching for God - and this is Heidegger's point-
''knows'' ofGod; those who ancmpt to prove his existence arc
those who kill him in precisely this way... Just as one can know
of the divine without grasping and IcnowingGod, so too is the thinking
ofBcing not a grasping, a possessing ora controlling.lU
This "knowing" ofGod and ofBcing appears reminiscent ofa belief.in, as it does not
resort to scientific or logical proofs, but seems rather to arise through faith. In this
manner I would suggest that Heidegger's thinking shares similarities with faith and
Gadamer, Hans--Georg. Heidegger's Ways. Trans. John W. Stanley. New York: State
UniversityofNewYorkPress,I994.Pgs.179-ISO.
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religious devotion.
In relation to this devotion and quest for Being Philipse asks '"Should we not
suppose, then, that thinking in the sense ofthe later Heidegger is a postmonotbeist
analogue of the search for God in faith?", and presents evidence that Heidegger's
discourse is structurally parallel to Christian discourse.1-' Philipse asserts that
Heidegger's laler discourse on Being is infonned by a Lutheran model, but he stresses
that this model is the/amr of Luther's thought, rather than the content. Philipse identifies
three tenets which make up the fonn ofLuther's thought, brought together as the
Lutheran model which Heidegger appropriates. The first of Luther's tenets is that there is
an original revelation ofGod in Christ and in the Bible."' His second tenet is that the
tradition ofthcology that brought God's revelation to humans betrayed the revelation
because it turned to Greek conceptions, which were incompatible with it, to articulate its
message. Luther was opposed to Aristotle's conception ofGod as eternal substance,
since as such God could not become manifest to humans in time. In the Christian faith an
experience oftemporaJity is central to human existence because it functions to remind
humanity of its finitude and of the necessityofliving one's life in preparation for the
seoond coming ofChrist.l16 Furthcnnore, Luther maintains that the Aristotelian
misconception ofGod was in fact sent to humans by God himself. This misconception
Philipse. Pg. 198.
2"DWL Pg. 182.
216Ibid.Pgs.174-175.
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was sent to humans as punishment for not acknowledging God, for conceiving ofGod on
the basis ofGreek thought. In other words, starting with the Greeks, God is not
acknowledged as God, and in response to this God sent [sic] us misconceptions of him
which result in God distancing himself from humanJcind.zl1 Thus we see that the
'''wisdom of the world", i.e., Greek philosophy, was made foolish by God.ZSI Since
wisdom is made folly, the possibility presents itselfthat the way to God is through faith,
not speculation. lbe last tenet is that because it is a "falling away from the origin", the
tradition, that is Scholastic philosophy emerging out of Aristotle, must be destroyed in
order to "revivc" the original message.m
We can sec how this model of tradition as falling from an origin has operated in
Hcidegger's thought, although Heidegger's relationship to Christianity has lead to a
reversal of the Lutheran model, wherein he looks to the Greeks as the origin of the
revelation ofBeing, and sees Christian theology as the conuption ofGreck thought and
the beginning of the fall. Initially Hcidegger agreed with Luther that Greek metaphysics
had conupted the Christian experience of life, which focused on the temporality ofHfc.
The origin at this point was then Christianity. But cventually he came 10 hold that the
Christian conception ofGod as a creator and ground ofbcings madc Being into a being
by taking God as the highest being.
Z17IliliLPg. 195.
ZlIllWl Pg. 186.
lI'9.Ihi.4,. PBS. 182-83.
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From this Lutberan model we can sec that although the content ofHeidcggcr's
discounc differs from Luther's, the fonn is the same: Being initially revealed itself to
man, this revelation was hidden by incorrect conccptionsofBcing made by metaphysics
and theology, sent to man from Being itself, and this tradition of the forgoncnncss of
Being must be destroyed in ordcrto reach the original revelation of Being. This call for
destruction seems to arise from the realization that in order 10 "think" properly we must
abandon the representational. subjectivist thinking ofmet8physics and instead wait for
and listen to the call of Being and open OUlStlves to Being once we hear this call. In
accordance with what Philipsc proposes, although Heideggcr maintains that Being is not
God, it can be said that his discourse on Being is structurally similar to Christian
discounc on God. Just as man waits for the grace of God, so too does Dascin wait for the
gift ofBeing;just as man devoles himselfto and worships God, so too does Dasein give
thanks to Being by thinking of Being and keeping Being in remembrance by constantly
staying with it.
Section 3.3 Conclusion
On the basis of this examination ofHeidegger'sconcept of "thinking" and his
references to ''the gift" and thinking as "thanking", I would suggest that these references
do have theological connotations., particularly in relation to Luther's theology and the
notion of faith. Heidcgger maintains that Being is nol God, but I would suggest that the
language he uses presents the possibility for discussion ofan analogy between Being and
III
God. I have made reference to the notion oC"grace" and drawn connections between
Heidegger's explanation offaith and his own explanations of Being. Heidegger insists
that the God ofChristian theology and that ofmetapbysical thought is considered to be a
being, but Macquarrie bas brought forth evidence 10 the cont:rary. Macquarrie suggests
that some theologians provide descriptions ofGod whicb specifically do oot refer 10 God
as a being. If Macquarrie's suggestions are com:ct, then il can be shown that God bas not
always been thought ofas a being. Furthermore, if God has not always been thought of
as a being, then it becomes apparenl that this is not acknowledged by Heidegger.
Heidegger's theological sounding language seems to result from IUs attempt to
step outside ofmetapbysics and speak of Being in a oon-IepreSCnlationai manner. It is in
fact questionable whether Heidegger is able to step outside ofmetapbysics because he has
no other option than to use metapbysicallanguage in explaining his conccpt of
"thinking". It would surely be extlemely difficull to write philosophicallexts that do not
have recourse to metapbysicallanguage, wlUcb according to Heidegger seems to be all-
encompassing. It would be even more difficult to anempt 10 speak of Being in a non-
representational manner, wben the representational language ofmetapbysics cannot be
avoided. As I bave explored, referring to the "gift" or Being, and to thinking as
''thanking'', bring to light the problems in trying to escape a language that is inherently
subjectivist and representational. Heidegger's attempt to escape: metaphysical language
seems to be successful when be turns to a phenomenological approacb that is similar to
faith and does not focus on metaphysical language. However, the phenomenology thai
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appears to help Heidegger escape from metaphysical language, the phenomenology that
emerges in What 15 Called Thinlcing? allows for comparisons to be made between
Heidcgger's philosophy and theology.
By using theistic language. particularly his notion ofa "leap of vision", Heidcggcr
seems to view phenomenology, as a method of reaching beings as they appear from out of
the unconccalment ofBcing, as analogous to an act of faith. Description stops short
when we reach the point at which a leap is required because anempts at describing what a
leap reveals arc futile. The point at which a leap is required is the point where we arc to
see the duality of Being and beings, thus Being as the process of unconcealment.
Furtbennore, since it is the seeing or looking itself that is essential in the leap of vision,
the leap of vision must be canied out by the individual. Consequently, one cannot
believe that a leap of vision is possible unless one partakes in the leap for oneself. Just as
in religious faith it is the revelation itself that gives birth to faith, 50 too is it the
experience: ofthe leap that will allow one 10 believe that such a leap is possible.
Phenomenology, at least as he defines it in Bejng and Time. is based on description, yet
description appears to be downplayed when Heidegger applies the phenomenological
method to an attempt to reach Being as the process ofunconcea1ment.. In fact,
description seems to appear in the fonn of the poetic word. Yct, this may be the point
Heidcgger is trying to make: that we must not exclusively rely on language for
phenomenology, not only because it is riddled with concepts, but because it is based on
a thinking that interprets the world in tenns of subjects and predicates which do not allow
113
beings to lie before us as they are in themselves. Perhaps Heidegger is telling us that in
order for language to speak through us, in order to be able to say lhe troth ofBeing, we
must not only refer to thinking, in the manner ofa letting-lie-before-us, but we should
tum to poetry as well. This may be the phenomenological seeing Heidegger is proposing:
it is a seeing that one must experience for oneself and that requires faith that one will see.
And if we are to desc:ribe what is viewed in this seeing,language, as the tool of
humankind. must be put aside in favor of saying of Being and the language of poetry.
Thus it can be said that Heidegger's radicalization oftheory·&ee desc:ription moves one
step further in revealing the importanc:e ofpoetry in describing Being.
Heidegger wanted to avoid the subjec:t-objec:t dualism and the subjec:t·ism of
metaphysical language. He did not want Being to be thought of as a highest value, or for
the thinking of Being to c:onsist in a willing which wills to make everything, inc:luding
Being. into a value. The alternative to using metaphysical language, which places man at
the c:enterofthe universe, is 10 remove man from this center by placing him in a position
of humility before Being and beings. Thus Heidegger speaks of Being giving itselfto
man and giving man thinking. his essential nature. As I have pointed out, this giving is
comparable to the amstian notion of"grac:e". When Heidegger relates thinking to
thanking, parallels can be drawn to religious devotion and worship. Heidegger does
maintain that faith differs from philosophy because it does not question. But although
this difference is imponant, when Heidegger's description of faith is elCplored it is
revealed that faith is similar to Heidegger's thinking of Being. [would suggest that these
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similarities, comparisons and parallels bring Heidegger's discussions of thinking about
Being in close proximity to, but not to be identified with, Christian theology. There: are
similarities between theology and Heidegger's thought, and analogies can be drawn
between God and Being, but I would maintain that the question of whether Being isa
substitute for God, and whether this is a fair question to pose, cannot be answered without
further investigation. Such further investigation would entail a more compr-ehensive
study ofHeidegger's texts, with the intention ofdetennining the legitimacy of his claim
that God has traditionally been thought ofas a being, and the relevance of his neglect of
theologies which seem to suggest otherwise.
liS
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